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Abstract 
The findings presented within this dissertation address the validity of current 
conceptions of trait impulsiveness, relationships between those traits and brain or 
laboratory measures of cognitive control, and links between impulsive traits and 
economic decisions under conditions of delay or uncertainty. The dissertation argues 
that impulsive traits and behavior may derive from failures of cognitive control at 
particular levels of abstraction within a hierarchically organized prefrontal network. The 
presented research affirms the multidimensional nature of impulsiveness as a construct 
(Chapters 2 & 3), and links individual differences in specific impulsive types to 
behavioral and neurobiological measures of control function (Chapters 3 & 4). The 
nature of motor, attentional, and non-planning impulsive types are contextualized by 
reference to evidence supporting a broad theory of behavioral control based on 
hierarchical organization of action, ranging from concrete acts to abstract plans and 
strategies (Chapters 1 & 6). We provide evidence linking concrete forms of urgent/motor 
impulsiveness to behavior and brain activation during response-related control, and 
more abstract and future-oriented premedititative/non-planning impulsiveness to 
decision control signals in more rostral PFC (Chapter 4). Finally, these findings are 
complemented by causal evidence from a neurostimulation study linking a contextual 
control network to risky decision making and attentional impulsiveness (Chapter 5).  
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Taken together, the results of these studies suggest that impulse control, 
cognitive control, and decision making share a common organization from concrete to 
abstract. Our reliance on diverse research techniques and confirmatory replication adds 
methodological rigor and provides convergent evidence linking impulsiveness to 
behavioral and decision control. This approach reinforces the advantages of an 
integrative approach across the domains of personality psychology, cognitive control, 
and decision making for understanding the flexible decision making and behavior. 
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1. The cognitive neuroscience of decision making: 
Prefrontal control of thought and action†  
1.1 Introduction 
Human thoughts and actions are notable for their flexibility. In the face of 
environmental uncertainty, we adaptively adjust our immediate behavior to reach our 
long-term goals. This flexibility carries significant computational costs: the brain must 
reconcile the shifting relationships among external stimuli, inhibit unimportant stimuli 
to focus on current goals, integrate past and present information, and project the 
consequences of an immediate action for future outcomes. Collectively, these 
psychological processes are referred to as “cognitive control” (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1978; 
Miller & Cohen, 2001).  
Under most conditions, our cognitive control systems perform admirably, 
allowing us to seamlessly navigate a world full of surprises, challenges, and novel 
experiences. At other times, however, we find ourselves at a disadvantage, struggling to 
select and maintain a desired course of action in the face of distraction, temptation, and 
impulsive urges to act otherwise. Occasional slips of control are ubiquitous and 
unavoidable, but chronic deficits in the ability to control decisions and actions can be 
                                                     
†This chapter is adapted from material published as “Coutlee, C., and Huettel, S. (2012). 
The Functional Neuroanatomy of Decision Making: Prefrontal Control of Thought and 
Action. Brain Research, 1428, 3-12.” 
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problematic, and sometimes debilitating. Persistent patterns of control failure – often 
observed as personality traits such as impulsiveness – can derail goal-directed decision 
making and result in excessive risk taking, shortsightedness, or similar self-regulatory 
failures (Hare, Camerer, & Rangel, 2009; Platt & Huettel, 2008b) . More serious failures 
of cognitive control systems are implicated in disorders such as attention deficit 
disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and alcohol or substance abuse  (Dalley, 
Everitt, & Robbins, 2011; Nigg, 2001; Whiteside & Lynam, 2001) . Investigation of the 
neurobiological mechanisms underlying such failures is critical to understanding both 
normal and abnormal variation in control-related traits like impulsiveness, and 
ultimately to addressing personal and societal challenges with roots in cognitive control 
failure. 
Research on the neural basis of cognitive control has focused on the prefrontal 
cortex (PFC), particularly its lateral (Brass, Derrfuss, Forstmann, & von Cramon, 2005; 
Koechlin & Summerfield, 2007a; Petrides, 2005) and dorsomedial (Botvinick, Cohen, & 
Carter, 2004; Paus, 2001; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004; 
Rushworth, Walton, Kennerley, & Bannerman, 2004) aspects. Seminal early work 
described control processes in broad terms, based on deficits shown in animals and 
humans with prefrontal lesions (Franz, 1902; Milner, 1963; Shallice & Burgess, 1991a; 
Spaet & Harlow, 1943). The advent of human functional neuroimaging, along with 
parallel advances in single-unit electrophysiology, has allowed researchers to parse 
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cognitive control into a set of specific sub-processes associated with distinct parts of PFC 
(Carter et al., 2000; Johnston, Levin, Koval, & Everling, 2007; Mansouri, Buckley, & 
Tanaka, 2007; Smith & Jonides, 1999). New models (Figure 1a) integrate psychological 
properties of cognitive control (e.g., organizing goals at multiple temporal scales) with 
functional properties of PFC (e.g., connectivity with other regions; Koechlin, Ody, & 
Kouneiher, 2003a). Though many aspects of prefrontal organization remain unknown, 
the development of new models for behavioral control represents one the most active 
areas of research in cognitive neuroscience.  
Figure 1: Models of cognitive control and of decision making. (A) In recent 
models of cognitive control, such as the cascade model shown here, control processes 
are organized according to their level of abstraction: from low-level control over 
actions to high-level control over broad plans for behavior. Information transfer is 
asymmetric, with processing of abstract information exerting a stronger influence 
(solid arrows) over more concrete processing than the reverse (dotted arrows). (B) 
Models of decision making, like that of Rangel and colleagues (2008) shown here, 
represent processes in terms of their functional, sequential contributions to choice. 
Potential actions are integrated with contextual/motivational information, assigned a 
value, and then compared in order to execute a decision/select action. Feedback about 
outcomes alters computations at each stage of processing. 
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In parallel, research on the neural basis of decision making – often described as 
the emerging discipline of “neuroeconomics” or “decision neuroscience” – has 
emphasized similar sets of psychological concepts and brain substrates. As outlined in 
typical reviews of this field, successful decision making requires adaptive behavior in a 
range of contexts: identifying a set of choice options, inhibiting the temptation of 
immediate or certain outcomes, integrating different variables like probability and 
value, and projecting the consequences of a choice for our goals (Figure 1b;  Camerer, 
Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2005; Platt & Huettel, 2008a; Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 
2008). Brain substrates within PFC have been found to play a critical role in flexible 
decision making (Koechlin & Hyafil, 2007; Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, 
Segalowitz, & Carter, 2004), in part through modulatory influences on affective and 
reward systems (Beauregard, Levesque, & Bourgouin, 2001; Hare et al., 2009; Knoch, 
Pascual-Leone, Meyer, Treyer, & Fehr, 2006a).  
Despite this striking conceptual and mechanistic overlap, human neuroimaging 
research into decision making has proceeded in a surprisingly separate fashion from 
research examining cognitive control. There have been only limited attempts to 
incorporate models of cognitive control into decision neuroscience research (e.g., Daw, 
O'Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006), with most current work describing PFC 
function in broad terms of “self-control” or “inhibition” (Figner et al., 2010a; Hare et al., 
2009; Knoch, Pascual-Leone, et al., 2006a). Cognitive control research, in turn, has yet to 
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capitalize on the innovations in experimental design common to decision neuroscience, 
such as advanced modeling of decision behavior or reinforcement learning (Dayan & 
Daw, 2008; Hsu, Krajbich, Zhao, & Camerer, 2009; Pine et al., 2009). Yet, recent 
developments in each area suggest that conditions may be ripe for the emergence of new 
connections between cognitive control and decision neuroscience research. 
1.2 Contrasting approaches to flexible behavior 
Neuroimaging research in these two domains – cognitive control and decision 
making – shares a common goal of understanding the neural systems supporting 
flexible selection of behavior, particularly in the face of uncertainty. Yet, researchers in 
each area pursue this goal via independent research traditions, emphasize different sorts 
of psychological processes, and employ distinct experimental designs and protocols. 
These differences of method and tradition obscure a key similarity: these areas examine 
complementary action-selection mechanisms at overlapping stages in the preparation-
action-feedback cycle characteristic of goal-directed behavior.  
Interest in the neural basis of cognitive control emerged relatively recently from 
the longstanding interest in psychological processes related to executive function 
(Fuster, 2008). Within the context of neuroscience research, cognitive control refers to the 
goal-directed biasing of neural processing, as when the PFC exerts a modulatory 
influence on other brain regions (Miller & Cohen, 2001). Commonly studied aspects of 
cognitive control include resolving conflict between competing action representations, 
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switching of resources between concurrent tasks, and learning and implementing rules 
for behavior. To evoke these control processes, researchers often employ tasks which ask 
participants to act contrary to an overlearned tendency or to withhold a prepotent 
response, as in the Stroop (Egner & Hirsch, 2005), Simon (Peterson et al., 2002), and stop-
signal tasks (Aron & Poldrack, 2006). Other common paradigms require participants to 
learn and implement experimenter-provided rules for mapping stimuli to responses, 
often under conditions which require flexible switching between task rules or response 
strategies (Bunge, 2004a). These tasks tend to emphasize experimental control of 
behavior, requiring participants to pursue artificial goals or respond according to rules 
dictated by the experimenter. 
Neuroscientific research into the mechanisms of decision making has been 
oriented toward understanding particular phenomena, rather than psychological 
processes. In large part, this reflects the tradition within behavioral economic research – 
and, to a lesser extent, within judgment and decision making research – to treat choices 
themselves as the explanatory targets for models (Bateman et al., 2004; Hensher & 
Bradley, 1993). Thus, research in decision neuroscience frequently adopts experimental 
paradigms that evoke interesting choice biases, such as ambiguity aversion (Huettel, 
Stowe, Gordon, Warner, & Platt, 2006a), loss aversion (Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 
2007), framing effects (De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006), or 
counterintuitive rejection of money in economic games (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, 
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Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003). Most studies require participants to make repeated and 
meaningful decisions, typically by linking the choice outcomes to participants’ 
compensation. This aligns participants’ personal interests with the goals of the 
experimenter, allowing the choices in the experiments to be used as an index of 
preferences within choice functions (Grether & Plott, 1979; Sen, 1971). Accordingly, 
research has heretofore emphasized the study of how individuals assess the desirability 
of each decision option and compare those options within some common neural 
currency (Hare, Camerer, Knoepfle, & Rangel, 2010; Smith et al., 2010), or “valuation” 
and “value comparison”, respectively (Montague & Berns, 2002).  
Three methodological differences may particularly underlie the divergence 
between cognitive control and decision neuroscience research. First, studies of cognitive 
control’s neural mechanisms typically target a particular brain region (i.e., the lateral 
PFC), whereas studies of decision making investigate particular phenomena (e.g., 
temporal discounting). Second, cognitive-control paradigms generally involve the 
learning and execution of experimenter-defined rules mapping stimuli to actions, while 
participants in decision-making paradigms are provided incentives to choose according 
to their own personal preferences. Third, paradigms in cognitive control often (but not 
always) seek to minimize interindividual heterogeneity in behavior, to ensure a common 
process across participants, whereas decision-making studies use interindividual 
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variability to better understand brain function (Chiu & Yantis, 2009; McGuire & 
Botvinick, 2010; Venkatraman, Payne, Bettman, Luce, & Huettel, 2009).  
Despite these methodological differences, both cognitive-control and decision-
making experiments often target neural computations occurring within the action-
selection cycle. A response inhibition task and a gambling task, for example, seem 
superficially dissimilar, and would typically be used to investigate different processes. 
These tasks share key similarities from an action-selection perspective, however: both 
require the representation of a controlling goal, the integration of past experience (from 
prior trials or individual preferences), the selection of the most goal-appropriate 
response, and the use of feedback to reinforce or modify future response tendencies. 
Accordingly, cognitive control and decision neuroscience studies address neural 
computations occurring throughout overlapping stages of the action-selection cycle, 
from goals through action to feedback. (The literatures do differ in the domain of control 
processes required, as when studying response conflict versus value comparisons.) 
Thus, although each literature approaches the problem of flexible action selection with 
different methods and traditions, there are fundamental similarities between the action-
selection processes their tasks engage and between the neural computations supporting 
that processing. 
  
9
1.3 Potential integration: Specifying control processes 
From seminal neurological observations to modern functional neuroimaging, 
substantial evidence implicates the lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC) in goal-directed 
behavior. Behavioral deficits following brain lesions have consistently implicated the 
PFC in the exercise of cognitive control (Kimberg, D'Esposito, & Farah, 1997; Robbins, 
1996), and prefrontal patients evince deficits in decision making, motivation, planning, 
and simulating actions, despite often largely intact perceptual abilities (Bechara, 
Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994; Eslinger & Damasio, 1985; Shallice, 1982). Such 
cases provided early clues to the control functions supported by the lPFC, and remain 
experimentally important today (Badre, Hoffman, Cooney, & D'Esposito, 2009). In recent 
years, however, advances in functional neuroimaging have revolutionized our 
understanding of the mechanisms of prefrontal control. These tools allow 
neuroscientists to explore in detail the functional organization of cognitive control 
within the lPFC. 
 A key question within cognitive control research has been whether lateral 
prefrontal control processing might demonstrate some form of topographic 
organization. Findings from functional neuroimaging studies have provided converging 
evidence for a rostral-caudal axis of control processing (Badre & D'Esposito, 2007; 
Koechlin et al., 2003a). Control over concrete stimulus-response associations is enacted 
by caudal regions, such as the dorsal premotor cortex. More abstract action 
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representations, such as plans for simple sequences or rules for selecting action based on 
context, are processed in more rostral areas, such as the dorsolateral PFC. Finally, 
control over highly abstract plans, goals, and response strategies is exercised by the most 
anterior portion of PFC, the frontopolar cortex. Control processing along this rostral-
caudal axis is hierarchical, such that increasingly abstract control engages additional 
cortical regions along the axis (Badre, 2008; Christoff & Gabrieli, 2000). 
Influential examples of this rostral-caudal framework are the cascade model 
(Koechlin et al., 2003a) and the policy abstraction model (Badre & D'Esposito, 2009b). 
The cascade model argues that control processes are organized according to their degree 
of temporal abstraction away from the present. That is, most posterior regions of lPFC 
support control based on the current context (e.g., mapping actions onto stimuli as they 
are perceived). More anterior regions integrate current information with information 
carried forward from a prior context, including longer-term goals. The policy abstraction 
model describes an explicit hierarchy in which higher-order abstract rules manage 
lower-order, concrete rules for action selection. First-order policies allow for selection 
between multiple competing actions (least abstract), second-order policies enable 
selection between different first-order policies (more abstract), and so on up multiple 
levels of increasing abstraction. Though these two models conceptualize abstraction and 
control in somewhat different ways, they posit a nearly identical rostral-caudal axis 
supported by very similar neuroimaging results (Badre & D'Esposito, 2007; Koechlin et 
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al., 2003a) and by data from patients with PFC lesions (Badre et al., 2009) or 
schizophrenia (Chambon et al., 2008). Together, these findings present a compelling case 
for the organization of action selection within lPFC according to a principle of 
abstraction. 
Such hierarchical models of action selection have been influential within 
cognitive control research, but they offer even greater potential advantages to 
researchers exploring the functional neuroanatomy of decision making. Lateral PFC 
activity is a common finding in decision neuroscience (Liu, Hairston, Schrier, & Fan, 
2010; Mohr, Biele, & Heekeren, 2010), but functional interpretations of this processing 
remain rudimentary. This may be in part due to decision neuroscience’s focus on 
behavioral phenomena and individual differences, as well as the use of more open-
ended designs to evoke preference-driven behavior. While advantages in many regards, 
these design conventions have their drawbacks: decision neuroscience research has 
identified lateral prefrontal contributions to a variety of flexible, goal-driven behaviors 
(e.g. Bach, Seymour, & Dolan, 2009; Bhatt, Lohrenz, Camerer, & Montague, 2010; 
Serences, 2008), yet failed to integrate these findings within a common explanatory 
framework.   
Hierarchical models of action selection drawn from the cognitive control 
literature suggest a ready antidote to the lack of structure within the decision 
neuroscience literature. These models provide an explanatory framework that can be 
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used to generate predictions regarding a variety of goal-directed behaviors, such as 
implementing complex or layered control, organizing sub-tasks, or optimizing behavior 
across response strategies. Under such conditions, lPFC activation at different levels of 
the rostral-caudal hierarchy should correspond to control exerted at characteristic levels 
of abstraction. This potential to segregate levels of control processing makes these 
models especially well-suited for application to decision neuroscience, where they could 
strengthen inferences regarding the control processes active throughout the lPFC during 
decision making. Researchers examining a few topics of shared interest between 
cognitive control and decision neuroscience are realizing these advantages, but this 
potential remains mostly untapped.  
In the following sections, this chapter considers two points of contact between 
the cognitive-control and decision-making literatures: strategy switching and self-
control. Each section evaluates how well current models of prefrontal function permeate 
that research area, and identifies key topics for future investigation. 
1.4 Relational integration and strategy switching 
Rules and policies that lead to good outcomes in one circumstance may not 
provide the same benefits at other times. Thus, adaptive behavior often requires 
individuals to maintain multiple plans and to shift between them to reach a particular, 
constant goal. The concept of “strategy switching,” though derived from decision-
making research, can be linked to behavioral and neurochemical findings from the 
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cognitive-control literature suggesting that reward, emotion, and control mechanisms 
interact to balance stable and flexible responding (Braver & Cohen, 2000; Cools & 
Robbins, 2004; Doya, 2008; Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004; Müller et al., 2007). In particular, 
strategy switching in decision tasks could be subsumed within the most abstract level of 
cognitive control (see Section 3). Within the cascade model, for example, switching 
between two different response rules requires a process of branching control that holds 
one rule in reserve while another is engaged. This process activates rostral PFC, like 
other tasks that involve integrating multiple outcomes in pursuit of a higher goal 
(Ramnani & Owen, 2004).  
Initiating a switch requires an evaluative component of control to detect 
circumstances justifying a change to behavior (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & 
Cohen, 2001). This process reflects strategic regulation of control resources by a more 
abstract, superordinate evaluative system. Significant attempts have been made to 
integrate cognitive control and decision making accounts of the evaluative system; these 
suggest that PFC regions such as the dorsomedial PFC monitor for either conflicts in 
information processing or action outcome values (Botvinick, 2007; Rushworth & 
Behrens, 2008). These influential models have established a precedent within the 
literature that supports the integration of research from both cognitive control and 
decision making studies.  
  
14
A canonical example of strategy switching can be seen in the shifts between 
exploratory and exploitative behavior. Organisms harvesting resources from a changing 
environment must balance an exploitative strategy that allows them to accumulate 
known rewards and an exploratory strategy that allows them to gather information 
regarding possibly more lucrative rewards (Cohen, McClure, & Yu, 2007; Montague & 
King-Casas, 2007). Daw and colleagues (2006) used fMRI to study voluntary transitions 
between exploratory and exploitative strategies. Reinforcement learning models 
classified participants’ trial-by-trial choices as either exploitative or exploratory, with 
these classifications then used to identify neural correlates of these strategies. 
Exploitative choices were associated with activation in the ventromedial PFC, consistent 
with the calculation of action value (Wunderlich, Rangel, & O'Doherty, 2009). 
Intriguingly, exploratory decisions were associated with increased activation in bilateral 
frontopolar cortex and medial intraparietal sulcus. Frontopolar activation in these cases 
may have reflected the higher-order decision making processes necessary to pursue a 
strategy of exploration, in the face of greater immediate rewards through exploitation. 
The authors suggested that bias signals from the frontopolar cortex exert inhibitory 
control over the current response strategy, in order to allow for the expression of the 
alternate exploratory strategy. 
Further investigation by Boorman and colleagues (2009) has clarified the critical 
role played by frontopolar cortex in selecting between response strategies. In this study, 
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participants made choices between two virtual slot machines. The payoff magnitude for 
each machine was varied randomly on every trial, so there was no advantage to tracking 
these amounts over time. By contrast, the probability of winning for each machine 
changed slowly over time, so participants could use that information to help them select 
which machine to play on each trial. Since the frontopolar cortex was known to be 
involved in switching between different response strategies, the authors suspected it 
might be involved in executing switches between the two slot machines. Their results 
supported this hypothesis, while also revealing a more specific mechanism: frontopolar 
cortex activation was found to encode the probability of winning on the unchosen slot 
machine, relative to the chosen machine. In other words, frontopolar cortex carried a 
signal about the benefits of the alternative choice strategy, relative to the current default 
choice strategy. Furthermore, both increased activation of frontopolar cortex and 
increased functional connectivity between the frontopolar cortex and parietal/premotor 
regions tended to predict a strategy switch on the subsequent trial. This evidence 
suggests that the frontopolar cortex plays both a general role in monitoring available 
response strategies and a specific role in implementing switches to the most beneficial 
strategy. 
These examples from the decision-making literature support the idea that 
frontopolar cortex tracks the relative benefits of behavioral strategies and initiates 
strategic shifts based on new information. By integrating advanced behavioral learning 
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models common within decision neuroscience and prior work in cognitive control, these 
investigators were able to derive tractable neural explanations for aspects of strategy 
switching, an important component of goal-directed decision making. It is probably not 
coincidental that this topic (strategy switching) and this brain region (frontopolar cortex) 
provide a nexus for integration between these two literatures. The frontopolar cortex is 
functionally both more specific and more selective than more posterior regions of PFC; 
that is, its activation tends to be reliably evoked by tasks that require some sort of 
relational integration (Christoff et al., 2001; Kroger et al., 2002) but not by most other 
sorts of executive processing (Banich et al., 2000; Ford, Goltz, Brown, & Everling, 2005; 
Garavan, Ross, Murphy, Roche, & Stein, 2002). Thus, the observation of activation in 
frontopolar cortex provides clearer insight into the likely underlying functional 
processes, as compared to activation in other parts of PFC (Poldrack, 2006).  
1.5 Inhibitory function and self-control 
Successfully implementing our decisions often requires inhibition of some form 
of temptation (e.g., immediate outcomes, certain rewards). Anyone who has undertaken 
a diet, struggled with an addiction, or contemplated cheating realizes the powerful 
forces arrayed against our long-term goals. Accordingly, there has been substantial 
interest in the ability to hew to a plan and pursue a goal, particular in the face of 
superficially more appealing alternatives, or “self-control”. Self-control has been of 
particular interest to decision-making researchers because of the violations of standard 
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theories associated with its failures (Bickel & Marsch, 2001; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981). But, 
its neural instantiation poses challenges. Unlike relational integration, self-control has 
not been unambiguously localized to a specific aspect of PFC (Cojan et al., 2009; Kuhn, 
Haggard, & Brass, 2009; Sharp et al., 2010). Yet, the integration of insights from the 
cognitive neuroscience literature holds promise for clarifying the neuroanatomical 
conception of self-control processes in decision making.  
Understanding how people inhibit unwanted actions has been a longstanding 
area of research in cognitive psychology, and now in cognitive neuroscience (Aron, 2007; 
Miyake et al., 2000). Canonical tasks—such as the oddball, anti-saccade, or stop signal 
paradigms—involve the execution of a highly automatic or practiced motor response, 
accompanied by intermittent signals to withhold or change that response. Successfully 
overcoming such pre-potent responses requires the contribution of a network of brain 
regions including the lPFC, as shown by converging evidence from lesion (Aron, 
Fletcher, Bullmore, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2003), single-unit (Sakagami et al., 2001), and 
functional neuroimaging studies (Liddle, Kiehl, & Smith, 2001). Regions such as the 
dorsolateral PFC, the anterior cingulate cortex, and the basal ganglia are often active in 
tasks involving self-control or response inhibition, with their engagement thought to 
reflect control processes related to rule or conflict monitoring and response halting 
(Aron et al., 2007; Bunge, 2004b; Krug & Carter, 2010). Additionally, a region of lPFC, the 
right ventrolateral PFC, has now been implicated in self-control under a variety of tasks 
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conditions, such as response inhibition, delay of gratification, and thought suppression 
(Cohen & Lieberman, 2010). Such research has been recently extended to establish a role 
for lPFC in the inhibition of a variety of automatic processes, such as in emotional 
regulation (Wager, Davidson, Hughes, Lindquist, & Ochsner, 2008; Winecoff, LaBar, 
Madden, Cabeza, & Huettel, 2010), as well as in conflict during goal-directed decision 
making (Hare et al., 2009). 
Decision neuroscientists initially examined self-control in the context of scenarios 
contrasting patience with temptation. A common experimental task asks participants to 
choose between a small reward received immediately and a larger reward received after 
a time delay. Resisting the temptation to choose the immediate (but less valuable) option 
is hypothesized to require self-control. In a series of such experiments, McClure and 
colleagues (2007; 2004) identified a limbic-reward network activated by tempting 
options, and a prefrontal-executive network active during all decisions. Additionally, 
the relative level of activation between these two networks could predict participants’ 
choices of either the tempting or patient option. This suggests that a neural system 
associated with cognitive control contributes when valuation requires patience (see 
Kable & Glimcher, 2007 for an alternative perspective). 
Expanding on this literature, decision neuroscientists have begun to examine 
compromises between conflicting goals and desires. Hare and colleagues (2009) 
explicitly examined self-control’s role in a familiar conflict: the decision to choose foods 
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based on health or taste. While undergoing fMRI, hungry participants rated images of 
healthy snacks and junk foods for both taste and healthiness, and then chose between 
such food items. Participants were sorted into two groups based on their behavior: the 
self-control group balanced health and taste information when choosing foods, while 
non-self-controllers chose based on taste alone. Imaging results demonstrated that an 
area of the left dorsolateral PFC was activated when participants resisted the temptation 
to choose tasty but unhealthy foods. Furthermore, this region was negatively 
functionally coupled, via an intermediate lPFC region, to the ventromedial PFC area 
representing the net expected value from the food choice. These results suggest a self-
control mechanism based in the lPFC may modulate value representations elsewhere in 
the brain. Furthermore, this modulatory influence may reflect the integration of abstract 
long-term goals, such as a desire for health, with more primary stimulus values, such as 
a food’s taste.  
While these studies suggest a lateral prefrontal role in self-controlled decision 
making, neuroimaging evidence alone cannot support causal conclusions regarding 
brain-behavior relationships. Techniques which allow the manipulation of neural 
processing, such as transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), serve as an essential 
complement to measurement-based techniques such as fMRI (Paus, 2005). Figner and 
colleagues (2010a) applied low-frequency TMS to the dorsolateral PFC to study 
interactions between self-control and valuation. Research participants made choices 
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between small immediate or larger delayed rewards, as in prior work (Kable & 
Glimcher, 2007; McClure et al., 2004), after TMS disruption of processing within either 
the left or right dorsolateral PFC. Disruption of left dorsolateral PFC caused participants 
to choose impatiently, foregoing larger later rewards for smaller immediate ones. By 
contrast, participants’ explicit valuations of these rewards were unaffected by TMS. 
These results suggest self-control processes instantiated in the left lPFC exert control 
over decisions independent of medial prefrontal/striatal valuation. Self-control of 
behavior may thus depend on a distinct lateral prefrontal process capable of arresting 
behaviors after the valuation stage of decision making (Luo, Ainslie, Giragosian, & 
Monterosso, 2009).  
 With a lateral prefrontal role established, self-control in decision making should 
now be examined within the cognitive control framework provided by the rostral-caudal 
hierarchical models discussed above. Self-control, like inhibitory control, is probably not 
a single process, but a class of processes which similarly restrain behavior (Magen & 
Gross, 2010). This processing could be organized according to levels of abstraction, in a 
manner analogous to the cognitive control models described above (see Section 3). 
Highly abstract planning and strategy selection might support self-control through 
avoidance of tempting contexts, or binding precommitment to non-tempting alternatives 
(e.g., joining Weight Watchers) (Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2002; Gul & Pesendorfer, 2001). 
Self-control that is rather less removed from temptation (e.g., driving past the candy 
  
21
store) might be enacted by rostrolateral PFC, while control in the face of temptation (e.g. 
stopping your hand in mid-reach for a candy bar) might activate more caudal PFC. Such 
an integrated approach makes clear and falsifiable predictions regarding neural 
mechanisms, and would anchor the various findings from imaging (Hare et al., 2009; 
McClure et al., 2007) and neurostimulation (Fecteau et al., 2007; Figner et al., 2010a; 
Knoch, Pascual-Leone, et al., 2006a) experiments addressing different forms of self-
control.  
1.6 Integrating cognitive control and decision neursocience 
approaches 
Cognitive control and decision making research thus address related questions: 
How is behavior adapted to fit changing circumstances? How are expected costs and 
benefits weighed to select actions? How are undesirable actions controlled or inhibited? 
In addressing such questions, cognitive-control models typically identify top-down, 
often prefrontal, executive processes which modulate target brain regions (Koechlin & 
Summerfield, 2007a; Miller & Cohen, 2001). Decision-making models, by contrast, 
translate such questions into terms of choices and value, and seek out neural responses 
correlated with individual preferences revealed by these choices (Rangel et al., 2008; 
Samanez-Larkin, Hollon, Carstensen, & Knutson, 2008). These approaches draw on 
distinct traditions and methods, but are clearly related, and should be understood as 
complementary. As the example of strategy switching illustrates, the integration of 
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theory and technique from cognitive control and decision making can foster unique 
insights into the computational mechanisms supporting behavioral control. Other topics 
of shared interest, such as self-control, possess great potential — yet still await the 
benefits of an integrative approach.  
Figure 2 illustrates the complementary contributions that decision neuroscience 
and cognitive control research can make to the understanding of action selection. 
Models of decision making emphasize sequential stages in the action-selection cycle, and 
thus provide organization along a temporal dimension. Cognitive control models 
contribute an anatomical dimension, consistent with hierarchical control of action 
selection: abstract representations engage rostral lPFC, while more concrete action 
representations engage caudal lPFC. Thus, representations residing at characteristic 
Figure 2: A schematic, integrative model of goal-directed decision 
making. Each stage of decision making requires control processes at multiple 
levels of abstraction. Competing actions, rules and strategies are selected via a 
value comparison process, in which cognitive control coordinates the 
assignment of action values based on the representations of superordinate 
goals, objectives, and strategies. 
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levels of abstraction (e.g. goals and strategies, rules and plans, and possible motor acts) 
are able to influence hierarchically lower and anatomically more caudal action 
representations throughout the stages leading from preparation to action execution. 
Valuation, a hallmark of decision neuroscience, plays a central role in the comparison 
and selection of competing representations at each level of abstraction. Value, reward, 
and outcome signals, derived from regions such as the ventromedial and orbital PFC as 
well as the anterior cingulate cortex and striatum, are integrated via functional 
interactions with the lPFC, where this information can be used to guide action selection 
(Daw et al., 2006; Diekhof & Gruber, 2010; Hare et al., 2009; Savine & Braver, 2010). 
Importantly, the functional neuroanatomy of these interactions should specifically 
reflect the abstractness of the valued representation, be it a broad goal or strategy or a 
particular motor act. 
With future adoption of rostral-caudal models, decision neuroscience has much 
to contribute at its interface with cognitive control. Decision neuroscience’s experimental 
repertoire includes a range of advanced quantitative models of choice behavior and 
valuation (Behrens, Hunt, Woolrich, & Rushworth, 2008; Glascher, Daw, Dayan, & 
O'Doherty, 2010; Kable & Glimcher, 2007). These techniques can deepen our 
understanding of the computational roles played by brain regions and networks—
particularly when used in conjunction with analyses of functional connectivity (Friston, 
Harrison, & Penny, 2003; Roebroeck, Formisano, & Goebel, 2005). Additionally, the 
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emphasis within decision neuroscience on modeling both within-subject choices and 
between-subject individual differences provides a complementary approach to the 
process-isolation common in cognitive control experiments. Modeling these sources of 
experimental variability and correlating them with phenomenon of interest should 
expand the explanatory power of control models, and foster the development of richer 
theories of flexible behavior. These advances in turn should allow researchers studying 
cognitive control and decision making to together establish a more rigorous theory of 
the prefrontal control of thought and action.  
1.7 Open questions 
Recently, cognitive control researchers have taken the initiative in exploring links 
with decision neuroscience. Emboldened by the successes of the rostral-caudal axis 
model of control, researchers are extending it to address processes typically associated 
with decision making. Koechlin and colleagues, for example, have described interactions 
between their cascade model hierarchy and a parallel hierarchy of medial incentive-
based motivation (Charron & Koechlin, 2010; Kouneiher, Charron, & Koechlin, 2009a). 
Likewise, Badre, Kayser, and D’Esposito demonstrated the role of their policy 
abstraction hierarchy in supporting abstract rule acquisition during an open-ended 
reinforcement learning task (Badre, Kayser, & D'Esposito, 2010). Despite their 
advantages, these models have only just begun to attract the attention of decision 
neuroscience researchers. One example is a report comparing distinct decision-making 
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and cognitive-control tasks which demonstrated a medial prefrontal topography 
engaged by increasingly abstract response, decision, and strategy control (Venkatraman, 
Rosati, Taren, & Huettel, 2009). Measures of resting-state functional connectivity have 
revealed hierarchically organized connections between this medial topography and the 
lPFC rostro-caudal axis (Taren, Venkatraman, & Huettel, 2011), solidifying this model’s 
utility for understanding the prefrontal mechanism underlying control of goal-directed 
action.  
This emerging integration of cognitive control and decision neuroscience models 
offers novel approaches and raises new and exciting questions regarding the 
mechanisms by which behavioral control succeeds or fails. Incorporating a hierarchical 
model of control may help explain individual differences in traits critical for effective 
regulation of behavior and decision making, including risk-taking, self-control, and 
impulsiveness. A relevant theory of behavioral change describes self-regulation as 
operating at nested levels, from concrete response inhibition in the face of temptation to 
abstract strategic avoidance of tempting situations, mirroring the proposed organization 
of prefrontal control systems (Magen & Gross, 2010). Similarly, an influential model of 
decision making proposes multiple interacting (and sometimes conflicting) valuation 
systems, from concrete stimulus-response-reward associations to abstract goal value 
derived from approaching a desired future state (Rangel et al., 2008). Drawing from 
these models, an interesting possibility is that imbalances in activation of hierarchical 
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sub-regions of medial and lateral PFC (reflecting imbalanced control at different levels 
of abstraction) leave individuals vulnerable to particular forms of self-control failure. 
Shortsighted behavior, for instance, could result from impoverished caudal prefrontal 
control over stimulus-response-reward associations in the face of temptation, but could 
be counterbalanced by robust rostral prefrontal control over goals, plans, and strategies. 
Conversely, inefficient abstract control implemented by rostral PFC might reinforce a 
present-oriented perspective, but be counterbalanced by momentary willpower reflected 
in robust caudal PFC activation. State influences such as fatigue, distraction, or 
emotional arousal might perturb the hierarchical balance of control processing in 
predictable ways, resulting in particular temporary failures of control. By contrast, 
chronically inefficient activation at some level of the control hierarchy (or globally 
throughout the hierarchy) might manifest as individual differences in control-related 
personality traits.  
Links between prefrontal models and trait measures of control are of particular 
interest for the personality construct of impulsiveness, which is commonly organized 
into subtypes reflecting concrete failure to control momentary urges, inability to sustain 
executive control over short time periods, and inability to engage in abstract future 
planning (Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995; Whiteside & Lynam, 2001). A previous 
study conducted by our research group provided preliminary evidence linking caudal 
medial PFC (mPFC) brain activation during a Stroop task to individual differences in 
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motor impulsiveness (Venkatraman, Rosati, et al., 2009). This study also showed an 
inverse relationship between rostro-medial PFC activation during strategic control and 
preferences for simple vs. complex thought, which are closely related to a lack of 
premeditation or non-planning impulsiveness (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; 
Patton et al., 1995). Another study linked under-activation of a lateral contextual control 
region (central within the lPFC hierarchy) during uncertain decision making to 
attentional impulsiveness (Huettel et al., 2006a). Finally, these and a follow-up study 
(Taren et al., 2011) demonstrated that decision making tasks engage a medial rostro-
caudal hierarchy which is functionally and anatomically interconnected with the lateral 
PFC hierarchy described by Koechlin, Badre, D’Esposito, and colleagues (Badre & 
D'Esposito, 2007, 2009b; Koechlin et al., 2003a). Together, these studies provide 
suggestive evidence linking PFC hierarchical control theories, decision making, and 
impulsiveness. These prior studies were not, however, designed to investigate 
individual differences in impulsive subtraits and their specific relationships with brain 
activation and behavior at increasingly abstract levels of control. Thus, important 
questions remain unaddressed: Is there sufficient evidence to organize impulsive 
personality sub-traits according to a principle of abstraction? Do relationships between 
trait, behavioral, and brain measures of impulsiveness support parallel medial and laterl 
prefrontal organization according to a principle of abstraction? And finally, does this 
model of hierarchically controlled personality and behavior advance our understanding 
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of impatient choice, risk-taking problem drinking, and similar failures of decision 
making?     
To address these questions, I present four studies conducted by myself and my 
colleagues focused on understanding the distinct but interacting mechanisms of decision 
control and impulsive personality. These studies investigated relationships between 
impulsive personality, behavior, and brain activation during tests of cognitive control 
and decision making. In study 1 (Chapter 2), we used exploratory factor analysis in a 
large sample to define a novel measure of three subtypes of impulsiveness reflecting 
distinct failures of behavioral control. In study 2 (Chapter 3), we formally confirmed 
these measures of attentional, motor, and non-planning impulsiveness, and 
demonstrated their validity for measuring different facets of impulse control. Study 3 
(Chapter 4) integrates this work on impulsive personality into a functional MRI study 
featuring behavioral and neurobiological measures of concrete control over motor 
responses and abstract control over decisions. Finally, study 4 (Chapter 5) used 
repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to investigate the causal role of a 
fronto-parietal impulse control network in risk-taking decisions. As a whole, this 
dissertation attempts to integrate techniques and evidence from the domains of 
personality psychology, cognitive control, and decision neuroscience in order to further 
our understanding of the mechanisms supporting flexible human behavior and decision 
making. 
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2. Exploring the structure of impulsive personality† 
Chapters 2 examines core varieties of trait impulse-control failure identified 
using the influential Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 11. By critically examining – and 
ultimately improving upon – this measure of impulsiveness, we shed light on the 
organization of impulse-control traits, and set the stage for further research linking 
differences in these traits to specific behavioral and brain measures (Chapters 3-5).  
2.1 Introduction 
Impulsiveness is a personality trait characterized by the urge to act 
spontaneously, without reflecting on an action and its consequences. Trait 
impulsiveness influences a number of important psychological processes and behaviors, 
including self-regulation (Baumeister, 2002; Neal & Carey, 2005), risk-taking (Kahn, 
Kaplowitz, Goodman, & Emans, 2002; Stanford, Greve, Boudreaux, Mathias, & L 
Brumbelow, 1996), and decision-making (Ainslie, 1975; Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 
2000; Huettel, Stowe, Gordon, Warner, & Platt, 2006b). Impulsiveness is also an 
important component of a number of clinical conditions (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000) including ADHD (Malloy-Diniz, Fuentes, Leite, Correa, & Bechara, 
                                                     
† This chapter is adapted from material to be published as “Coutlee, C. G., Politzer, C. S., 
Hoyle, R. H., & Huettel, S. A. (2014). An abbreviated impulsiveness scale constructed 
through confirmatory factor analysis of the barratt impulsiveness scale version 11. 
Archives of Scientific Psychology, 2(000).” 
  
30
2007; Moeller, Barratt, Dougherty, Schmitz, & Swann, 2001), borderline personality 
disorder (Critchfield, Levy, & Clarkin, 2004; Ferraz et al., 2009), alcohol and drug abuse 
(Kollins, 2003; Perry & Carroll, 2008), and impulse control disorders such as pathological 
gambling (Petry, 2001; Steel & Blaszczynski, 1998). 
Impulsiveness is typically measured using self-report scales, which provide a 
relatively inobtrusive means of assessment across a variety of clinical and research 
contexts. The most widely administered instrument for this purpose over the last two 
decades is likely the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale version 11 (BIS-11, Patton et al., 1995), 
cited by over 2300 sources since its formulation (Google Scholar, 2013). Consisting of 30 
questions, the BIS-11 is thought to measure six related yet distinct impulsiveness factors 
which have been combined to form three more general subtraits: attentional 
impulsiveness (“inability to concentrate”), non-planning impulsiveness (“lack of 
premeditation”) and motor impulsiveness (“action without thought”).  
This canonical three-factor structure of impulsiveness is based on a long tradition 
of work by Barratt and colleagues recognizing the multidimensional structure of 
impulsiveness while also seeking to distinguish impulsive traits from comorbid 
constructs, including anxiety, sensation seeking , and risk-taking (Barratt, 1965; Barratt & 
Patton, 1983). Beginning with the BIS-10, Barratt and colleagues formalized their 
multidimensional hypothesis by developing a set of items to reflect three underlying 
impulsiveness constructs: motor, non-planning, and cognitive (rapid decision) 
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impulsiveness (Barratt, 1985). Subsequent studies supported the scale’s 
multidimensional nature, but led to the re-conceptualization of cognitive impulsiveness 
as attentional impulsiveness (Luengo, Carrillo-De-La-Pena, & Otero, 1991; Patton et al., 
1995). Prior evidence thus consistently supports the multidimensional nature of BIS-11 
impulsiveness, yet significant questions remain regarding the number and nature of 
influences underlying scale responses. 
While the BIS-11 continues to see frequent use in both experimental and clinical 
contexts, attempts to replicate its canonical three-subtrait structure have generated 
inconsistent results. Studies examining BIS-11 items using both exploratory (Haden & 
Shiva, 2008; Von Diemen, Szobot, Kessler, & Pechansky, 2007) and confirmatory (Ireland 
& Archer, 2008; Ruiz, Skeem, Poythress, Douglas, & Lilienfeld, 2010; Someya et al., 2001) 
factor analysis raise important questions regarding the adequacy of the canonical BIS-11 
factor structure. Some factors have proven unreliable, such as those reflecting cognitive 
instability (e.g., “I have racing thoughts”) and perseverance (e.g., “I change residences”) 
(Fossati, Barratt, Acquarini, & Ceglie, 2002; Fossati, Di Ceglie, Acquarini, & Barratt, 
2001). Others, such as cognitive complexity (i.e., a preference for complex thought) seem 
to measure personality constructs distinct from core impulsiveness (Cacioppo & Petty, 
1982). These inconsistencies may derive in part from analytical choices during the 
formulation of the BIS-11. In particular, the use of principal components analysis 
(Gorsuch, 1990), the failure to account for the ordinal nature of scale responses (Muthén, 
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1983; Wirth & Edwards, 2007), and the reliance on exploratory analysis without 
subsequent confirmatory replication (MacCallum, Roznowski, Mar, & Reith, 1994) 
represent substantial drawbacks to the original analytic approach. Finally, it is unclear 
which BIS-11 scales provide the most psychometrically sound measures of 
impulsiveness: the six-factor first order scales, the canonical three-factor second-order 
scales, or the commonly (mis)used single-factor total score (Fossati et al., 2002; Stanford 
et al., 2009).  
We sought to address these concerns by conducting a methodologically rigorous 
examination of the factor structure underlying the BIS-11, with the goal of producing an 
efficient and generalizable instrument for measuring impulsiveness. Attempts have been 
made to produce abbreviated scales using BIS-11 items – in part because a shorter scale 
would be valuable in clinical contexts and for survey research – but these studies either 
failed to test the adequacy of the underlying BIS-11 factor structure (Spinella, 2004) or 
sought only a unidimensional “total-score” impulsiveness measure (Steinberg, Sharp, 
Stanford, & Tharp, 2013). Additionally, these studies failed to confirm data-driven 
models in separate replication samples, leaving their scale models vulnerable to 
capitalization on chance variation (MacCallum, Roznowski, & Necowitz, 1992). 
In the present study, we applied exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis 
(EFA and CFA) to re-examine the structure of impulsiveness as measured by the BIS-11 
and to produce an alternative scale, the ABbreviated Impulsiveness Scale (ABIS). Our 
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analysis proceeded in three broad phases. In our first study (Chapter 3), we applied EFA 
to BIS-11 responses from a large, diverse sample in order to identify an underlying 
factor structure and eliminate invalid and unreliable factors and items. The resulting 
ABIS factor model confirmed the attentional, non-planning, and motor impulsiveness 
subtraits proposed by Patton and colleagues (1995) for the BIS-11. In our second study 
(described in Chapter 4), we applied CFA to test the replicability and generalizability of 
our ABIS factor model in two separate replication samples. The ABIS model proved 
more generalizable than the canonical BIS-11 model. Finally, we validated the ABIS 
scales through comparison to the BIS-11 as well as independent behavioral and 
personality measures related to impulsiveness (Chapter 4). The ABIS provides an 
efficient, internally consistent, and generalizable alternative to the BIS-11 for measuring 
impulsiveness. 
2.2 Methods 
Analysis Procedure 
Our study was designed to examine the associations between answers to 
personality survey questions (items) about impulsiveness, and to improve upon an 
existing measure of impulsive personality based on these items (i.e., the BIS-11). We 
used the factor analytic techniques EFA and CFA to identify latent impulsive personality 
traits influencing people’s answers to these items. Our study proceeded in eight stages, 
illustrated in Figure 3. In Stage 1, we used CFA to test the ability of the canonical BIS-11 
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model to describe the patterns of item responses. This canonical model failed, leading us 
to Stage 2, wherein we used exploratory, data-driven techniques (parallel analysis and 
EFA) to construct an initial seven-factor model of impulsive personality. Next, in Stage 
3, we identified and took steps to eliminate three problematic factors which were 
unrelated to core impulsiveness. In Stage 4, we targeted individual questions for 
removal, eliminating idiosyncratic items that remained poorly explained after 
accounting for the influence of identified factors. In Stage 5, we eliminated additional 
factors that were poorly measured by the remaining set of items. In Stage 6, we finalized 
our factor model, and simplified the structure of the exploratory model to fit the format 
of a confirmatory factor model, leading to the formulation of the ABIS scale. Finally, we 
conducted analysis stages seven and eight as part of a separate study (detailed in 
Chapter 3) in which we confirmed and validated the ABIS scales as measures of 
attentional, motor, and non-planning impulsiveness. In Stage 7, we confirmed our final 
model in two additional independent samples. In Stage 8, we validated the abbreviated 
scales derived from our model by relating them to personality and behavioral outcome 
variables reflecting impulsiveness.  
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Figure 3: Flowchart of Study Analysis Procedure. Small boxes 
represent individual scale items, with color representing separate 
factors. The ABIS model was developed through Stages I–VI using 
EFA and CFA (Sample 1), resulting in a three-factor, 13-item scale. 
The ABIS was replicated in Stage VII (Samples 2 and 3) and validated 
in Stage VIII (Samples 1 and 4). Mot = motor impulsiveness; NP = 
nonplanning impulsiveness; Att =attentional impulsiveness. 
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Participants 
Our primary sample comprised 1549 adults from Durham, North Carolina, and 
surrounding communities (Sample 1). Participants were recruited via advertisements in 
community locations. All participants provided informed consent under protocols 
approved by either the Duke University or Duke University Medical Center Institutional 
Review Boards.  
Primary Study Measures 
BIS-11: Responses to these 30 items measuring attentional, motor, and non-
planning impulsiveness (Patton et al., 1995) were our main measures of interest. 
Responses were indicated on a computer using a four-point scale: Rarely/Never, 
Occasionally, Often, Almost Always/Always. Subjects from all four of our samples 
completed the BIS-11. Items from this scale were used to formulate the ABIS. The BIS-11 
items are publicly available at http://www.impulsivity.org/measurement/bis11. 
Additional Personality Measures: As a part of our revision process, we compared 
responses on the BIS-11 scale to the Need for Cognition and Faith in Intuition scales 
(Epstein et al., 1996). 
EFA and CFA 
Model fit was evaluated using the comparative fit index (CFI, Bentler, 1990) and 
the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA, Steiger, 1990). These indices have 
been found to perform well with categorical data under our study conditions, including 
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relatively large samples, 4-item response scales, and categorical model estimation 
techniques (DiStefano, 2002; Edwards, Wirth, Houts, & Xi, 2012; Green, Akey, Fleming, 
Hershberger, & Marquis, 1997; Hutchinson & Olmos, 1998). We used CFI values of .95 
and RMSEA values of .06 as cutoffs for good model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). RMSEA 
cutoffs of .08 and .10 indicated acceptable and marginal fit, respectively (MacCallum, 
Browne, & Sugawara, 1996). See the accompanying JARS (Cooper, 2008) and JARS_SEM 
(Hoyle & Isherwood, 2013) questionnaires for methodological details regarding our 
factor analyses. 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Stage 1: Attempting to confirm the canonical BIS-11 factor 
structure of impulsive personality 
We first attempted to confirm the BIS-11 factor structure proposed by Patton et 
al. (1995). These authors identified six latent factors underlying responses to the 30 BIS-
11 scale items. Theoretical motivations led them to aggregate the six factors into three 
second-order factors. We used CFA to test the suitability of these six-factor and three-
factor solutions, as well as a single-factor (unidimensional/total-score) solution. Each 
item was specified to load on a single factor based on its assignment to the BIS-11 
subscales (Patton et al., 1995). The magnitude of these loadings as well as the factor 
covariances were freely estimated from the data (corresponding to congeneric 
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indicators, an oblique factor rotation, and strict simple structure). Model fit results 
appear in Table 1. 
None of the models based on the canonical BIS-11 structure provided an 
acceptable explanation of the relationships between item responses. CFI values were 
especially poor for these models. Substantial exploratory modification was required to 
achieve conventionally acceptable model fit. Based on these results, we concluded that 
the item-factor relationships specified by the canonical BIS-11 model could not explain 
the patterns of responses in our sample.  
2.3.2 Stage 2: Exploring an alternative factor structure of impulsive 
personality using EFA 
Given our failure to explain our data using CFA based on the canonical BIS-11 
structure, we turned to EFA to derive an alternative, data-driven model of the factor 
structure underlying BIS-11 responses.  
Parallel analysis (Horn, 1965) using either permuted data or random normal data 
(Buja & Eyuboglu, 1992) indicated seven factors underlying our BIS-11 responses. EFA 
using the unrestricted factor model (Hoyle & Duvall, 2004; Jöreskog, Sörbom, Magidson, 
& Cooley, 1979) corroborated this estimate, demonstrating that a seven-factor solution 
was the simplest that achieved good fit (RMSEA = .05, CFI = .95). The model fit results of 
this initial EFA appear in Table 1, and served as the basis for constructing the 
abbreviated scale. 
  
39
Our initial seven-factor EFA revealed a number of constructs that roughly 
correspond to subtraits identified in the original BIS-11 six-factor model, including self-
control/planning, motor, perseverance, cognitive complexity, and cognitive instability 
factors. These initial EFA results also suggested a number of avenues by which the scale 
could be abbreviated without sacrificing inferential validity. Our revision proceeded as 
detailed below, with the EFA re-estimated at each stage after the removal of items. 
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Table 1: Factor analysis results and fit statistics. 
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2.3.3 Stage 3: Eliminating factors unrelated to core impulsiveness 
Our initial EFA revealed a factor similar to BIS-11 “cognitive complexity” and 
anchored by items 15, 18, and 29, which refer to a preference for complex thought. These 
items appeared to measure “need for cognition,” a personality construct that is distinct 
from impulsiveness and that reflects an individual’s desire for effortful cognitive activity 
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). We examined the correlation between responses on items from 
the cognitive complexity factor (with higher scores reflecting a stronger preference for 
complex thought) with responses on the Need for Cognition scale (Epstein et al., 1996), 
collected from a subset of 379 subjects. Items 15 (r = .68, 95% CI [.62, .73]), 18 (r = .51, 95% 
CI [.43, .58]) and 29 (r = .42, 95% CI [.33, .50]) exhibited substantial correlation with the 
need for cognition total score, while the weaker-loading items 12 (r = .34, 95% CI [.25, 
.43]) and 20 (r = .26, 95% CI [.16, .35]) showed moderate correlation. We chose to remove 
items 15, 18 and 29 on the basis of their strong relationship to need for cognition. 
Our initial EFA also revealed a doublet factor consisting of items 11 and 28. 
These items, which refer to either “squirming” (11) or “restlessness” (28) at plays, the 
theater, or lectures, are redundant in concept and wording. This suggests that the 
“factor” they form may instead reflect a method effect unrelated to the underlying 
structure of impulsive personality (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). 
Consistent with this assessment, the polychoric (i.e., ordinal) correlation between items 
11 and 28 (r = .73, 95% CI [.71, .75]) was among the largest between BIS-11 items. To 
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eliminate this method factor, we chose to remove one of these two items on the basis of 
item R2 values. These values, which express the proportion of variance for each item 
explained by the modeled factors, can be taken as an estimate of item reliability (Brown, 
2006). Item 11 was removed, as it proved less reliable than item 28 upon removal and re-
estimation (R2 = .22 for 11 vs. .34 for 28). 
We also identified a financial factor consisting of items 10, 22, and 25, each of 
which refers to impulsiveness in the context of spending or saving decisions. Financial 
factors have been identified in previous EFAs of BIS-11 responses (Fossati et al., 2001). 
Although this factor was stable and meaningful, it reflects shared variance related to 
impulsiveness within the particular domain of financial behavior, as opposed to a 
broader trait relevant across domains. Supporting this interpretation, two of the three 
financial items also had substantial cross-loadings on the more domain-general planning 
(item 10, .37) and motor (item 22, .39) factors. We chose to eliminate this domain-specific 
financial factor by removing item 25, which possessed the highest loading on the 
financial factor (.77) and had no substantial loadings on other factors. Items 10 and 22 
were retained at this stage.  
In summary, our first round of item elimination evaluated three questionable 
factors from our initial seven-factor EFA solution, which led to the elimination of five 
items: three (15, 18, 29) reflecting need for cognition, one redundant item (11) from a 
restlessness doublet, and one item (25) anchoring a domain-specific financial factor.  
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We re-estimated our EFA using the 25 remaining indicators and found a five-
factor solution to be most interpretable, as summarized in Table 1. This model revealed 
factors similar to the original BIS-11 first-order factors, save for the eliminated factor of 
“cognitive complexity.” 
2.3.4 Stage 4: Eliminating unreliable items 
To identify additional items for removal, we examined the item reliability, as 
indexed by R2 values. Items with low reliability fell into one of three categories: items 
with a pejorative interpretation (e.g., “I can only think about one thing at a time;” 23, 27, 
3), items with an unusual or narrow relevance (e.g., “I change hobbies;” 4, 24), or items 
with residual variance due to eliminated financial factor (10, 22). When all remaining 
BIS-11 items were sorted in descending order by their R2 values, we found a clear gap 
separating the low-reliability items mentioned above (R2s from .02-.26) from the 
remaining items (R2s from .32-.74). We chose to eliminate all seven of these low-
reliability items. Stepwise elimination starting with the lowest reliability item did not 
substantively change the ordering of items by reliability. The elimination of these seven 
items left 18 items. We re-estimated our EFA using the 18 remaining items, and found a 
five-factor solution to be most interpretable, as summarized in Table 1. 
2.3.5 Stage 5: Eliminating poorly measured doublet factors 
Two of the factors in our five-factor, 18-item model were doublets, featuring 
strong loadings of only two items. These doublet factors reflected perseverance (items 16 
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and 21, “I change jobs” and “I change residences”) and cognitive instability (items 6 and 
26, “I have ‘racing’ thoughts” and “I often have extraneous thoughts when thinking”). 
The cognitive instability doublet factor also possessed moderate loadings (.32-.35) on 
three items (5, 9, 28), but each of these items had stronger loadings on an attention 
factor. To address the “local dependence” (Yen, 1993) reflected by these item pairs, we 
first attempted to eliminate single items from each factor. Removing either item 16 or 21 
from the perseverance factor or item 6 or 26 from the cognitive instability factor left the 
remaining doublet item with low reliability (< .27), so we excluded all four items. 
Removing the perseverance and cognitive instability doublet factors left a 14-item scale. 
We re-estimated our EFA using the 14 remaining items, and found a three-factor 
solution to be most interpretable, as summarized in Table 1. These three factors reflected 
constructs similar to motor, non-planning, and attentional impulsiveness, as 
conceptualized by Patton et al. (1995). 
2.3.6 Stage 6: Confirming the final model using CFA 
We translated the results of our three-factor, 14 item EFA into a model reflecting 
simple structure, such that each item loaded on only one factor, while still allowing the 
factors themselves to covary. These results were promising, indicating marginal fit, as 
summarized in Table 1. Translation to simple structure resulted in one attention item 
with a low R2 value (28, R2 = .20) which we removed, leaving a final set of 13 items 
(Table 1). 
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After examining the model covariance matrix and modification indices (which 
quantify the expected change in model fit due to freeing individual fixed model 
parameters), three error covariances were introduced between model uniqueness terms 
to account for residual dependence between scale indicators. First, the error terms for 
items 17 and 19 were allowed to covary, as their similar wording and proximity on the 
scale may have introduced additional methodological correlation. Similarly, error terms 
for items 12 and 20 were allowed to covary on the basis of their similar wordings. 
Finally, error terms for 13 and 30 were allowed to covary. These two items share 
conceptual variation related to long-term planning, and often emerged as a doublet 
separate from items 1 and 7 (which reflect more near-term planning) with higher-order 
EFA extractions. We believe that there is sufficient evidence to justify a planning factor 
including all four items, but we allowed for the error covariance between 13 and 30 to 
account for the additional dependence between these items. Freeing these three 
parameters accounted for residual covariance without altering the general pattern and 
magnitude of item loadings, which remained large (.55-.82) and highly significant (p < 
.001) in all cases.  
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Results for our final model, including the three correlated uniqueness terms 
specified above, are represented in Figure 4. Model fit (Table 1) was good. The final 
model features five items measuring attentional impulsiveness (5, 8, 9, 12, and 20), four 
items measuring non-planning impulsiveness (1, 7, 13, and 30) and four items 
measuring motor impulsiveness (2, 14, 17, and 19), for a total of 13 items, less than half 
of the length of the canonical BIS-11 scale. This reduction was achieved by eliminating 
non-relevant factors, doublet factors, and unreliable items.  
Figure 4: Path diagram illustrating the final ABIS model estimates from Sample 1. 
The 13 items of the ABIS (boxes, BIS-11 item numbering) measure correlated 
attentional (5 items), motor (4 items) and non-planning (4 items) latent factors 
(ellipses). Item error/uniquenesses are shown as circles; three error covariances 
(curved arrows between errors) were specified. Parameter estimates are standardized 
using the variances of the continuous latent variables as well as the variances of the 
outcome (i.e., Mplus StdYX) All parameters are significant at p < .001. 
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2.4 Discussion 
Based on our model of BIS-11 responses refined through analysis Stages 1-6, we 
present the ABIS, a 13-item scale measuring attentional (5 items), non-planning (4 items), 
and motor (4 items) impulsiveness (Table 2). Scores on each subscale are computed by 
averaging responses on all relevant subscale items, after accounting for reverse-scored 
items (see Appendix A for scale administration and scoring forms).  
 
We initially set out to re-evaluate the factor structure of the BIS-11 using large 
samples, modern factor analytic methods (exploratory and confirmatory), and 
replication in independent samples. Despite demonstrating poor model fit for the BIS-
11’s particular factor structure, our final model corroborates its general structure, in that 
 Table 2: ABIS scale items. 
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our attentional, motor, and non-planning scales resemble the core impulsiveness 
subtraits identified by Patton et al. (1995). We argue, however, that our systematic 
removal of extraneous factors and unreliable items allows the ABIS to measure these 
preserved core subtraits with enhanced efficiency and clarity. 
Our results indicate that the ABIS scales are best considered measures of separate 
but correlated components of impulsiveness. The scales show moderate intercorrelation 
(rs from .40-.50,  95% CIs ±.04). Each scale taken alone is acceptably unidimensional after 
accounting for the specified correlated uniquenesses. By contrast, a single-factor model, 
reflecting a total score computed by summing across all items, showed unacceptable fit, 
reflecting a lack of unidimensionality across all items. Despite cautions from the scale 
authors (International Society for Research on Impulsivity, 2013), the BIS-11 subscales 
are commonly summed to produce a total scale, a practice which ours and others results 
fail to support (Ireland & Archer, 2008; Steinberg et al., 2013). We hope to avoid this 
misunderstanding with the ABIS scales, and emphasize that ignoring the 
multidimensional nature of the ABIS or BIS-11 items undermines the validity of 
inferences made using those items. Inappropriate use of summary scores in such cases 
introduces additional measurement error (Fava & Velicer, 1996; Wood, Tataryn, & 
Gorsuch, 1996) and can distort the nature of the measured construct (Cattell, 1958). This 
can lead to problems identifying true relationships between impulsiveness traits and 
other constructs, particularly in cases where those relationships differ between motor, 
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attentional, and non-planning impulsiveness. We reiterate that it is psychometrically 
inappropriate to combine the ABIS scales, and that they should not be summed or 
averaged to calculate a total score. (Note that, according to our analyses, this admonition 
holds equally for the original BIS-11 subscales, as well).  
Although evidence from our study clearly supports the multidimensionality of 
impulsiveness measured via BIS-11 items, we remain agnostic regarding the potential 
existence or nature of a “general impulsiveness” construct underlying attentional, 
motor, and non-planning impulsiveness. The correlated-factors model we describe does 
not specifically address this question, as this model is statistically equivalent to a first-
order factor model with a single general (second-order) impulsiveness factor. Bi-factor 
models (Holzinger & Swineford, 1937), in which items simultaneously load on both a 
general and uncorrelated specific factors (e.g., attention, motor, non-planning), suggest 
an alternative possible higher order structure (Yung, Thissen, & McLeod, 1999). Our 
own findings and those of others (Steinberg et al., 2013) indicate that bi-factor solutions 
based on the canonical BIS-11 model and items provide a poor fit overall, although 
including a general factor did improve models based on the full 30-item set. Applied 
specifically to the ABIS items, we found that a bi-factor model produced fit somewhat 
inferior to our final three-factor model, with moderate-to-strong loadings on the general 
factor across all items (covariance terms were dropped to allow model estimation). 
Practical attempts to investigate specific impulsiveness traits in isolation should control 
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for correlated impulsiveness constructs using standard methods (CFA/SEM, multiple 
and hierarchical regression), as opposed to more speculative bi-factor models. More 
generally, however, questions regarding the higher-order structure of impulsiveness 
require further investigation, and are likely to be informed by emerging bi-factor 
modeling techniques, including exploratory bi-factor analysis (Jennrich & Bentler, 2011; 
Muthén & Muthén, 2012).  
Our final model supports the general structure of impulsiveness types as 
measured by the BIS-11 items, identifying core attentional, motor, and non-planning 
subtypes. The ABIS model can be used directly to guide and constrain future factor 
analytic and structural equation modeling approaches to measuring impulsive subtraits 
using the BIS-11 items. Use of such covariance modeling approaches in conjunction with 
our model to identify these three latent impulsiveness traits is ideal as such an approach 
formally models measurement error, which typically attenuates estimates of 
relationships between variables (Hurley et al., 1997). Given that many investigators 
interested in measuring impulsiveness are unfamiliar with covariance modelling 
approaches, however, we also present an ABIS scale which approximates impulsiveness 
factor scores through equally-weighted averaging of items (Appendix A). This 
procedure is simple, well-established, and produces interpretable measures. Given our 
efforts to enhance the internal consistency of the scale items, such an approach also 
produces reliable and conceptually coherent measures (Osborne & Costello, 2004). The 
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resulting ABIS scales represent efficient, internally consistent, and generalizable 
measures of attentional, motor, and non-planning impulsiveness. The ABIS can be used 
as a brief alternative to the BIS-11 or as a model for reanalyzing previously collected BIS-
11 questionnaire responses. 
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3. Confirmation and validation of a novel model of 
impulsive personality† 
3.1 Introduction 
Factor analysis and principal components analysis have long been mainstay 
techniques for the development of personality scales (Floyd & Widaman, 1995; 
Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). These techniques are, however, fundamentally 
exploratory and data-driven: They identify patterns capable of summarizing or 
explaining data, with few constraints from prior knowledge or theory (Brown, 2012; 
Hurley et al., 1997). While these techniques are powerful and useful, they are also 
vulnerable to identifying patterns and relationships which reflect chance variation in a 
particular sample, rather than true relationships in the population (MacCallum et al., 
1992; Osborne & Costello, 2004). Addressing this “overfitting problem,” which is a 
known weakness of exploratory analysis techniques, is essential for the formulation and 
presentation of both replicable results and reliable psychometric measures.  
There has been a recent resurgence of interest in techniques for improving the 
reproducibility of results within the psychological sciences (Makel, Plucker, & Hegarty, 
2012; Roediger III, 2013). Although empirical science is by nature self-correcting in that 
unreliable results will over time be discredited, such results can in the meantime be 
                                                     
† This chapter is adapted from material to be published as “Coutlee, C. G., Politzer, C. S., 
Hoyle, R. H., & Huettel, S. A. (2014). An abbreviated impulsiveness scale constructed 
through confirmatory factor analysis of the barratt impulsiveness scale version 11. 
Archives of Scientific Psychology, 2(000).” 
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damaging, misleading the public as well as other scientists, and contributing to 
inefficiencies and wasted research resources (Ioannidis, 2012; Pashler & Wagenmakers, 
2012).  
Given these known challenges, psychological scientists should seek to hold 
themselves to a high standard when it comes to the reliability of the results they report. 
One of the most fundamental and effective checks on the reliability of results is the 
replication and refinement of findings using an independent sample prior to reporting 
the results in the research literature (Brown, 2006; MacCallum et al., 1994). Self-
replication is particularly important when the results of an investigation are intended for 
broad application, as with the development of a personality scale. In such cases, if it is at 
all technically and financially feasible to do so, a responsible psychological scientist 
should report the results from an out-of-sample replication (particularly of scales based 
on exploratory factor analytic techniques) to support the reliability and reproducability 
of a proposed measure. 
We previously reported the formulation of the ABIS, a revised and abbreviated 
self-report scale which measures attentional, motor, and non-planning impulsiveness. 
The ABIS was formulated using exploratory factor analysis, meaning that the 
assignment of items to factors, which underlies the scale scores, was vulnerable to 
capitalization on chance or overfitting problems. Related problems have constrained the 
usefulness of the original BIS-11 scale, as its structure has been inconsistently replicated 
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across a number of investigations (Haden & Shiva, 2008; Ireland & Archer, 2008; Ruiz et 
al., 2010). The large initial sample used to formulate the ABIS only partially addresses 
this concern (MacCallum et al., 1996).  
Additionally, although the sample used to formulate the ABIS included adult 
community members in addition to university students, evidence from independent 
samples with different demographic characteristics is desirable to support the 
generalizability of the ABIS. Recent work has shown internet to provide a useful check 
on the generalizability of psychological findings (which typically rely on convenience 
samples of undergraduate students) (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Gosling, 
Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004).  
To address these concerns, we replicated the ABIS model in two independent 
samples: a sample of 657 adults with similar demographic composition to support the 
replicability of our findings, and an internet sample of 285 adults to support their 
generalizability. Finally, we sought to validate the ABIS scales as measures of 
attentional, motor, and non-planning impulsiveness. To do so, we related ABIS scale 
scores to their corresponding BIS-11 scale scores, as well as to a variety of personality 
measures relevant to impulsiveness. Finally, we demonstrated the utility of the ABIS 
scales by measuring a relationship between the ABIS motor impulsiveness and self-
reported alcohol consumption in a sample of 49 healthy adults. Our methodologically 
rigorous approach reinforces the generalizability and future replicability of the ABIS, 
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and supports its widespread use as an efficient measure of attentional, motor, and non-
planning impulsiveness.  
3.2 Methods 
Analysis Procedure 
In Stages1-6 of our first study (described in Chapter 2) we used the factor 
analytic techniques EFA and CFA to develop an abbreviated scale model from the BIS-11 
items, which led to our ABbreviated Impulsiveness Scale, the ABIS. In our second study 
described here, we sought to replicate our scale model, and validate the ABIS 
measurements of motor, attentional, and non-planning impulsiveness, as depicted by 
Figure 5. In Stage 7 we confirmed our final model in two additional independent 
samples. Finally, in Stage 8, we validated the abbreviated scales derived from our model 
by relating them to personality and behavioral outcome variables reflecting  
impulsiveness. 
Participants 
Two replication samples comprised 657 adults from the Duke University 
community (Sample 2) and 285 adults recruited online (Sample 3) through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (www.MTurk.com). A final validation sample comprised 49 adults from 
the Durham and surrounding communities (Sample 4) recruited for a functional 
neuroimaging experiment examining impulsive decision making. We also report 
findings from Sample 1 (N = 1549; described in Chapter 2). All participants provided 
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informed consent under protocols approved by either the Duke University or Duke 
University Medical Center Institutional Review Boards.  
  
  
Figure 5: Flowchart of study analysis procedure for replication and 
validation. Small boxes represent individual scale items, with color 
representing separate factors. The ABIS model was developed through 
Stages I–VI using EFA and CFA (Sample 1), resulting in a three-factor, 13-
item scale. The ABIS was replicated in Stage VII (Samples 2 and 3) and 
validated in Stage VIII (Samples 1 and 4). Mot = motor impulsiveness; NP = 
nonplanning impulsiveness; Att =attentional impulsiveness. 
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Primary Study Measures 
Our primary measures of interest included the following. 
BIS-11: Responses to these 30 items measuring attentional, motor, and non-
planning impulsiveness (Patton et al., 1995) were our main measures of interest. 
Responses were indicated on a computer using a four-point (five-point in Sample 3) 
scale: Rarely/Never, Occasionally, Often, Almost Always/Always. Subjects from all four 
of our samples completed the BIS-11. Items from this scale were used to formulate the 
ABIS. The BIS-11 is available at http://www.impulsivity.org/measurement/bis11. 
Alcohol Use Questionnaire: Impulsiveness plays a key role in the initiation and 
maintenance of substance use and dependence (Dick et al., 2010). To examine alcohol 
use, we asked participants from Sample 4 to self-report the number of alcoholic 
beverages consumed on a typical day on which they drank, as well as the average 
number of days per week alcohol was consumed. From the product of these quantities, 
we derived a measure of average number of alcoholic drinks consumed per week. 
Additional Personality Measures: We included additional measures in order to 
validate the ABIS. These included the Decision Making Styles Inventory Analytical and 
Intuitive scales (Nygren & White, 2002), the Need for Cognition and Faith in Intuition 
scales (Epstein et al., 1996), the BIS/BAS (Carver & White, 1994), the UPPS impulsiveness 
scale (Whiteside, Lynam, Miller, & Reynolds, 2005), the Brief Sensation Seeking Scale 
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(Hoyle, Stephenson, Palmgreen, Lorch, & Donohew, 2002), and the Impulsive Sensation 
Seeking Scale (Zuckerman, 2002). 
Delay Discounting - Proportion Impatient Choice: Delay discounting, or the 
tendency to devalue (discount) delayed rewards, is a common behavioral measure of 
impulsive decision making (Bickel, Odum, & Madden, 1999; Reynolds, Richards, Horn, 
& Karraker, 2004; Wittmann & Paulus, 2008). Participants from Sample 4 completed an 
experiment examining delay discounting in which they made 100 choices between two 
different options: a small monetary amount which could be received immediately, and a 
larger amount ($5-$50) which could be received after a delay (1-8 weeks). We used the 
proportion of choices for which the participant chose the impatient (smaller but 
immediate reward) option as an individual difference measure of impulsive decision 
making. 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Model fit was evaluated using the comparative fit index (CFI, Bentler, 1990) and 
the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA, Steiger, 1990). These indices have 
been found to perform well with categorical data under our study conditions, including 
relatively large samples, 4-item response scales, and categorical model estimation 
techniques (DiStefano, 2002; Edwards et al., 2012; Green et al., 1997; Hutchinson & 
Olmos, 1998). We used CFI values of .95 and RMSEA values of .06 as cutoffs for good 
model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). RMSEA cutoffs of .08 and .10 indicated acceptable and 
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marginal fit, respectively (MacCallum et al., 1996). See the accompanying JARS (Cooper, 
2008) and JARS_SEM (Hoyle & Isherwood, 2013) questionnaires for methodological 
details regarding our factor analyses. 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Stage 7: Confirming model generalizability through replication 
using CFA 
We next sought to confirm the structural validity of our abbreviated scale using 
CFA in two additional samples.  
We replicated the model structure in an additional survey-based sample of 657 
adults (Sample 2). CFA was performed on responses to relevant BIS-11 items, specifying 
the final model from Stage 6. All estimated model parameters, including the three error 
covariance terms specified, were highly significant (p < .001). Overall model fit in the 
replication sample was acceptable to good (Table 1). Model fit for the canonical three-
factor Patton model was marginal to unacceptable in this sample (Table 1). Modification 
indices did not suggest any conceptually relevant alterations. The results of this analysis 
confirm the factor structure of our abbreviated scale, which produced acceptable 
replication fit values in an independent sample.  
To reinforce the generalizability of our abbreviated scale model, we implemented 
a stringent test by using CFA to replicate the model structure in a diverse Internet 
sample of 285 individuals (Sample 3), who completed the BIS-11 using a five-point 
response scale. Analysis procedures were identical to those used previously. CFA was 
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performed on BIS-11 item responses, specifying the final model from Stage 6 (including 
error covariances). Again, all estimated model parameters were highly significant (p < 
.001). Overall, model fit in this replication sample was acceptable/marginal to good 
(Table 1); the CFI value indicated good fit, while the RMSEA value, at .08, was equal to 
the cutoff value separating acceptable and marginal fit for this index. Model fit for the 
canonical BIS-11 three-factor structure was unacceptable in this sample (Table 1). 
Modification indices did not suggest any conceptually relevant alterations. The results of 
this analysis confirm the factor structure of our abbreviated scale, which produced 
acceptable replication fit values in a moderately sized Internet sample. The Internet 
sample we collected is quite diverse in terms of age, occupation, race, and geography, 
more so than most samples studied within personality psychology (Buhrmester et al., 
2011; Gosling et al., 2004). Additionally, the model results generalized well to a five-
point response scale (although we recommend the continued use of a four-point scale 
for the sake of continuity with previous research).  
Replication of the abbreviated scale model in both a local community and a 
broad Internet sample indicates the enhanced generalizability of the abbreviated 
measure. This is particularly clear in comparison to the performance of the canonical 
BIS-11 model, which showed inadequate fit in every sample we examined. 
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3.3.2 Stage 8: Validating the abbreviated scale using measures of 
personality and behavior 
Properties of the ABIS scale scores in our factor analysis samples are shown in 
Table 3. In particular, the internal consistency of the abbreviated scales, as indexed by 
coefficient alpha, is greater than that for the canonical BIS-11 subscales in all of our 
samples (BIS-11 α: attention = .71; motor = .64; non-planning = .69). The ABIS values are 
also similar to or greater than those published for the BIS-11 subscales in another large 
sample (Stanford et al., 2009). Coefficient alpha is positively related to the number of 
scale items, (Churchill Jr & Peter, 1984; Voss, Stem Jr, & Fotopoulos, 2000), leading us to 
expect that abbreviated scale scores would exhibit lower reliability by this measure. The 
fact that alpha was actually greater for the shortened ABIS scale scores supports our 
contention that the ABIS more reliably measures the impulsive subtraits latent in the 
BIS-11 item set. 
 
 
  
62 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for ABIS scales in factor analysis samples. Sample 3 items were measured from 1 to 
5, rendering comparisons to Samples 1 and 2 uninformative. Summary statistics are shown for scale scores, which 
reflect the average of relevant  items. Two individuals from Sample 2 reported no gender. *Gender difference p < .05. 
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We next investigated the relationships between the ABIS scales, BIS-11 subscales, 
and relevant measures of personality and behavior. Table 4 depicts correlations between 
the ABIS and BIS-11 scales. The ABIS attention, motor, and non-planning scales were 
strongly correlated with their corresponding BIS-11 subscales (rs from .71-.77, 95% CIs 
±.02 ). We also sought to validate the ABIS scales by relating them to a range of self-
report and behavioral individual difference measures relevant to impulsiveness. These 
associations are depicted in Table 5. Despite the brevity of the ABIS scales, they 
produced correlations similar to those of the corresponding BIS-11 scales across a variety 
of personality measures. Consistent with their enhanced internal consistency, there was 
a general tendency towards stronger correlation estimates using the ABIS scales. 
Exceptions tended to have clear explanations, such as the drop in correlation between 
ABIS non-planning and need for cognition after the intentional removal of “cognitive 
complexity” items in stage three of our analysis. The similar pattern of associations 
observed with the ABIS and BIS-11 scales supports the inferential validity of the ABIS 
scales when measuring motor, attentional, and non-planning impulsiveness. 
Previous research has suggested that impulsiveness is positively related to 
alcohol consumption in both teenagers (Fossati et al., 2002) and adults (Granö, Virtanen, 
Vahtera, Elovainio, & Kivimäki, 2004), with small-to-moderate effect size (r around .30 
using the BIS-11). We found that self-reported alcohol consumption in adults was 
related to both ABIS motor impulsiveness (r = .44, p < .05,
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Table 4: Correlation of ABIS and BIS-11 scales in Sample 1. B11 Tot =BIS-11 total score; att =attention; mot= 
motor; sc= self control; cc= cognitive complexity; per= perseverance; ci= cognitive instability; NP= nonplanning; 
fin= finance; nfc= need for cognition. BIS-11 first-order scales are abbreviated in lowercase whereas second-order 
scales are abbreviated in upper case. All correlations significant at p < .01 (excepting BIS-11 cognitive complexity with 
cognitive instability). 
  
65 
 
 
Table 5: External validity of ABIS scales. a Scale defference (ABIS vs. BIS-11, 2-tailed) p < .05. * p < .05. 
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95% CI [.17, .64]) and BIS-11 motor impulsiveness(r = .32, p < .05, 95% CI [.04 .55]). The 
difference between these correlations was non-significant (p = .21), although this 
comparison was likely underpowered (Sample 4, N = 48). Definitive conclusions 
regarding the relative size of these effects across scales will require further analysis in 
larger samples, although the results for motor impulsiveness and alcohol consumption 
are consistent with the overall trend towards strengthened relationships when using the 
ABIS scales. There were no significant relationships with ABIS attentional or non-
planning impulsiveness in this sample (r = .06, 95% CI [-.23, .34] and r = .20, 95% CI [-.10, 
.45]).  
We also examined the relationship between the ABIS scales and delay 
discounting, a laboratory-based measure of impulsive decision making. Decisions 
reflecting delay discounting (willingness to accept a smaller reward that can be obtained 
sooner) are commonly described in terms of self-control and impulsiveness (Coutlee & 
Huettel, 2012; Madden & Bickel, 2010), although studies have not found a consistent 
relationship between delay-discounting behavior and self-reported impulsiveness 
(Reynolds, Ortengren, Richards, & de Wit, 2006; Stanford et al., 2009). Consistent with 
these latter findings, we failed to identify any significant relationship between 
impulsiveness (measured with either the ABIS or BIS-11) and individual differences in 
impatient decision making in a delay discounting task (r = .04 to .28, 95% CIs from -.24 to 
.52), although ABIS motor and BIS-11 non-planning impulsiveness showed trend-level 
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relationships (p < .10). Because statistical power was relatively low for this sample (N = 
49), the extent of any relationship between impulsiveness and delay discounting remains 
unclear. 
3.4 Discussion 
We describe the replication and validation of the ABIS, a brief scale that 
measures attentional, motor, and non-planning impulsiveness with better than twice the 
efficiency of the BIS-11, while maintaining similar, if not better, score reliability. 
Critically, we demonstrated through CFA in two independent replication samples that, 
in contrast with the BIS-11, the model underlying the ABIS generalizes to independent 
samples drawn from separate respondent populations. Finally, we show evidence 
linking impulsiveness measured by the ABIS to other relevant personality measures and 
alcohol consumption. These findings support the use of the ABIS in basic, clinical, and 
applied research as either a brief alternative to the BIS-11 or a model for reanalyzing 
previously collected BIS-11 questionnaire responses. 
The ABIS motor impulsiveness scale, anchored by items 2 and 19, “I do things 
without thinking,” and “I act on the spur of the moment,” reflects spontaneous, reactive, 
and uninhibited action. ABIS motor impulsiveness relates strongly to BIS-11 first- and 
second-order motor impulsiveness, and moderately to UPPS Urgent impulsiveness 
(tendency for uninhibited emotional acts), intuitive decision making style, BAS Fun 
Seeking, and sensation seeking. ABIS motor impulsiveness also showed a significant 
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association with alcohol consumption – and that association was at least as large as that 
from the full BIS-11, using far fewer items. 
The ABIS non-planning impulsiveness scale, anchored by items 1 and 7, “I plan 
tasks carefully” and “I plan trips well ahead of time,” (both reverse scored), reflects a 
tendency to forego premeditation, forethought, and preparation. It encompasses lack of 
planning for shorter-term, concrete aims, such as tasks and trips, as well as longer-term 
and more abstract aims, such as job security and the future more generally. It is strongly 
related to the BIS-11 second-order non-planning and first-order self-control subscales, as 
well as the UPPS premeditation scale. It also shows moderate relationships with an 
analytical decision making style and sensation seeking.  
The ABIS attentional impulsiveness scale, anchored by items 12 and 9, “I am a 
careful thinker” and “I concentrate easily,” (both reverse scored), reflects inconsistency 
in controlling thought and focusing attention. ABIS attentional impulsiveness relates 
strongly to the BIS-11 first-order attention and self-control subscales, as well as to UPPS 
perseverant impulsiveness (lack of focus and self-discipline). ABIS attention also 
showed moderate negative relationships with analytical decision making style and need 
for cognition.  
To the best of our knowledge, our study reflects the first attempt to 
independently re-examine and abbreviate the BIS-11 using both EFA and CFA methods 
in replication samples. The ABIS scales, which are the result of this analysis, are 
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supported by findings from two previous studies that sought to produce reduced scales 
based on BIS-11 items. Spinella (2004) produced a 15-item scale with three subscales by 
selecting the five items with the highest loadings on each factor from a three-factor 
orthogonal principal components analysis of BIS-11 data. This method, while 
straightforward to implement and useful for eliminating some of the weaker-loading 
and unreliable BIS-11 items, fails to identify the strong minor factors present in the data, 
such as the restlessness doublet removed in stage three of our analysis. Unextracted 
minor or methodological factors can distort the nature of major factors and the patterns 
of item loadings (Wood et al., 1996) . This may be the case for the Spinella attentional 
impulsiveness factor, which is dominated by the restlessness doublet. Aside from the 
attention scale, however, the Spinella results show consistency with the ABIS scales, 
although our model tends to show modestly better fit values and replicability (Table 6).  
Another study (Steinberg et al., 2013) used unidimensional item response theory 
models to produce an eight-item scale intended to replace the problematic BIS-11 total 
score measure. The authors initially applied a bi-factor item response model based on 
the BIS-11 canonical three-factor model. As in our own analyses using EFA/CFA (Table 
1) and a bi-factor model (Table 6), they found that many of the BIS-11 items failed to 
load on the general impulsiveness factor, and that many items were characterized by 
high correlations with only one or two other items,  
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Table 6: Alternative model analysis results and fit statistics 
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reflecting doublets or other minor factors (often due to methodological factors such as 
similarity of item wording). The authors subsequently switched to fitting 
unidimensional models with the goal of producing a revised BIS total score scale by 
eliminating items not clearly related to the general impulsiveness factor (resulted in an 
eight-item scale). Although the primary goal and factor analysis technique used in this 
study are distinct from our own, their results, which revealed problematic doublet 
factors and items poorly related to impulsiveness, are consistent with our own findings. 
Additionally, the items they selected for their alternative BIS total-score scale represent a 
subset of the items which we independently selected for the three scales of the ABIS. 
Given this convergence of findings, we decided to test the unidimensionality of the 
Steinberg et al. scale items in our data. In contrast to their findings, but consistent with 
our own results based on the BIS-11 and ABIS models, we found that a unidimensional 
CFA model failed to acceptably fit the data (Table 6). In the case of both the Steinberg et 
al. scale and the ABIS items, the patterns of covariation between scale items indicate the 
need for a more complex explanation of the data (e.g., multiple latent factors). Some 
form of general impulsiveness may, in fact, underlie responses to BIS-11 items. 
However, neither our own findings nor the findings of Steinberg et al., Spinella, or 
Patton et al. provide sufficient evidence to justify measuring such a general 
impulsiveness factor using a total-score scale. Instead, the evidence supports the use of 
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scales designed to measure separate impulsiveness subtraits, as with the ABIS 
attentional, motor, and non-planning scales. 
A limitation of our analyses and the resulting ABIS scales is that they measure a 
relatively focused set of impulsive traits. This results from our decisions to restrict our 
study to the thirty BIS-11 items and produce an abbreviated scale representing only the 
core factors reflected by those items. The ABIS is thus less comprehensive than measures 
drawn from a broader set of items, such as the UPPS impulsiveness scale (Whiteside et 
al., 2005). Our analyses led us to discard a number of peripheral factors reflecting 
financial impulsiveness, restlessness, and cognitive instability, amongst others. 
Although these constructs are poorly measured by the available set of BIS-11 items, they 
represent potentially interesting aspects of impulsive personality and behavior. 
Impulsiveness in financial domains (e.g., “I buy things on impulse”), for instance, 
predicted impatient economic decisions in a delay discounting task (r = .35, p < .05, 95% 
CI [.08, .57]). Such minor factors hold promise as a possible basis for expanded or 
alternative scales measuring the broader set of impulsive traits reflected by the BIS-11 
items.  
We are optimistic that our findings will inform such a broader discussion and 
contribute to future attempts to revise the BIS scale. In the present, however, we argue 
that the ABIS scale scores provide the most efficient and reliable measures of core 
attentional, motor, and non-planning impulsiveness currently available. The ABIS 
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generalizes well to independent samples, especially compared to the BIS-11. An 
important direction for future research, however, will be to examine the properties of 
the ABIS in high-impulsiveness populations such as substance abusers, ADHD patients, 
and prison inmates. 
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4. Differential modulation of response and decision 
control networks by motor and non-planning 
impulsiveness  
4.1 Introduction 
To effectively select actions consistent with their goals and desires, decision 
makers must resolve conflicts and dilemmas at a variety of levels of abstraction. Plans or 
strategies, rules, context, and possible actions represent potential sources of conflict, 
especially when goals and actions of very different types (e.g., long-term health goals 
and immediate hunger urges) compete for control of action (Rangel et al., 2008). 
Effective decision making under circumstances requiring flexibility and discernment 
relies on neural systems supporting cognitive control (Miller & Cohen, 2001). Cognitive 
control systems allow us to translate our plans and goals into consistent action, 
particularly when the most rewarding course of action is unclear or there is competition 
between immediate desires and long-term goals (Coutlee & Huettel, 2012). 
Research examining the organization of cognitive control within the prefrontal 
cortex (PFC) suggests that control may be anatomically organized as a hierarchical 
network according to a principle of abstraction (Badre, 2008; Koechlin & Summerfield, 
2007b). Evidence from neuroimaging and lesion studies indicates that as control 
becomes more temporally or conditionally abstract, increasingly more rostral regions of 
lateral PFC are engaged to mediate control of behavior, with the influences of these 
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regions exerted in a hierarchical fashion (Azuar et al., 2014; Badre et al., 2009; Koechlin 
et al., 2003a). Research incorporating motivational information and rewards has shown 
that the medial PFC (mPFC) follows a parallel hierarchical organization (Taren et al., 
2011), with mPFC signals reflecting reward contingencies influencing lateral action-
selection hierarchical processing (Charron & Koechlin, 2010; Kouneiher, Charron, & 
Koechlin, 2009b). Consistent with this evidence, our work has previously shown that 
conflicts between motor responses, decision options, and choice strategies engage 
progressively more rostral regions of mPFC (Venkatraman, Rosati, et al., 2009). 
If control over decisions and actions is organized along a principle of abstraction, 
then failures of control possess a corresponding structure. Impulsiveness, a trait which 
reflects an inability to control immediate urges and insensitivity to future consequences, 
is typical conceptualized as a set of linked subtraits reflecting immediate failures to 
control urges, contextual failures to focus attention over the short-term, and long-term 
failures to plan and organize action sequences (Patton et al., 1995; Whiteside & Lynam, 
2001). We recently reexamined the widely applied Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 11 (BIS-
11) and developed an improved measure of impulsiveness which measures more 
focused impulsive traits. Despite substantial alterations to the original BIS-11 scale, this 
study confirmed this core organization of motor, attentional, and non-planning 
impulsive subtypes. These definitions parallel the hierarchical organization of action 
processing in the PFC from short term and concrete to long term and abstract (Badre & 
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D'Esposito, 2009a). Though they derive from distinct methodologies, the structural 
similarity between models of impulsiveness cognitive control suggest an intriguing 
possibility: the organization of control functions in the brain may define patterns of 
impulsive action and decision which manifest over time as trait motor, attentional, and 
non-planning impulsiveness. Previous studies provide evidence linking hierarchical 
control regions with impulsive traits and behaviors. Motor impulsiveness is linked to 
response control (Gorlyn, Keilp, Tryon, & Mann, 2005; Logan, Schachar, & Tannock, 
1997) and has been shown to correlate with caudal mPFC activation during Stroop and 
go/nogo tasks (Horn, Dolan, Elliott, Deakin, & Woodruff, 2003; Venkatraman, Rosati, et 
al., 2009). More abstract attentional and non-planning impulsiveness, by contrast, have 
been associated with disrupted performance in planning and delay-discounting tasks 
(de Wit, Flory, Acheson, McCloskey, & Manuck, 2007; Mitchell, Fields, D'Esposito, & 
Boettiger, 2005; Mobini, Grant, Kass, & Yeomans, 2007), and modulation of rostral PFC 
regions supporting contextual and strategic control during economic decision making 
(Huettel et al., 2006b; Venkatraman, Rosati, et al., 2009). Together, these findings 
implicate brain regions along a caudal-to-rostral axis in increasingly complex and 
abstract varieties of impulsive behavior and decision making. Yet, no neuroimaging 
studies have been conducted to investigate the relationship between impulsiveness, 
cognitive control, and decision making.   
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Given the evidence suggesting a parallel organization of cognitive and impulse 
control, we hypothesized that impulsive trait subtypes might be reflected in control 
exercised at predictable levels of the hierarchy, and that these influences should be 
identifiable as differential brain activation, particularly within mPFC regions previously 
associated with concrete and abstract decision control (Kouneiher et al., 2009b; 
Venkatraman, Rosati, et al., 2009). We tested these hypotheses by measuring brain 
activation and behavior during tasks requiring control over either competing motor 
responses (a Stroop task) or decision options (a delay-discounting task). Behavior and 
brain activation during these tasks were correlated with multiple individual difference 
measures of trait motor, attentional, and non-planning impulsiveness. We hypothesized 
that concrete, short-term motor impulsiveness would be positively correlated with brain 
activation and response times during response control, while increasingly abstract 
attentional and non-planning impulsiveness would influence activation of more rostral 
PFC regions supporting foresight during decision making. The results of this study 
speak to the fundamental organization of control over behavior and decisions, and the 
links that exist between this organization and self-report measures of trait 
impulsiveness.      
4.2 Experimental design and methods 
Participants 
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Forty-nine adults (mean age 24.04, range 20-34, 26 female) recruited from the 
Durham, North Carolina and Duke University communities participated in the 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment. Participants had normal or 
corrected to normal vision, reported no history of psychiatric or neurological disorders, 
and were screened for MRI safety and pregnancy (where appropriate) prior to the fMRI 
session. Participants were compensated $20 per hour for the study ($30-$35 total), but 
earned additional immediate or delayed bonus payments during the task (details 
below). The study procedures were approved by the Duke University Medical Center 
Institutional Review Board. 
Study Procedure 
Participants completed a single study session which consisted of one-hour of 
fMRI imaging followed by a half-hour of completing self-report questionnaires. Total 
study length was about two hours. Prior to undergoing fMRI, participants provided 
informed consent, were screened, familiarized with the study equipment and procedure, 
and trained on the task. Participants then completed a practice run of the counting 
Stroop and delay-discounting decision making tasks prior to the fMRI scan. Participants 
completed a high resolution anatomical MRI scan followed by three 11-minute fMRI 
scan runs: one for the counting Stroop task, and two of the delay discounting task. After 
the imaging was completed, participants responded to a number of self-report 
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questionnaires focused on impulsiveness (scales detailed below). Participants were then 
debriefed and paid for their participation.  
Counting Stroop Task  
We implemented a counting Stroop task (Figure 6a) to reveal neural activation 
reflecting cognitive control over competing motor responses. We programmed the task 
using the Psychophysics Toolbox version 2.54 (Brainard, 1997) for MATLAB 
(MathWorks, 2011). Following the procedures of Bush et al. (Bush et al., 1998) and 
Venkatraman et al. (Venkatraman, Rosati, et al., 2009), participants responded to 
alternating twenty-second blocks of neutral and incongruent trials. For each trial, 
participants were presented with between one and four identical, vertically listed words, 
and were asked to push a button on a four-button handheld controller indicating the 
number of words appearing on the screen. Participants were encouraged to respond as 
quickly as possible while still maintaining high accuracy, and had 1.5 seconds to enter 
their response. For neutral trials, the displayed words (which differed from trial to trial) 
were common animal names (e.g., dog, cow). For the incongruent trials, the displayed 
words were numbers between one and four (i.e., one, two, three or four), and there was 
always a mismatch between number of words appearing on the screen and the meaning 
of those words (e.g. “one” repeated four times, requiring the response “four” from the 
participant). Each participant completed 18 neutral blocks and 18 incongruent blocks, 
with eight trials per block, for a total of 288 counting Stroop trials per participant.           
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Delay Discounting Task 
We implemented a delay-discounting task (DD, Figure 6b) to reveal neural 
activation reflecting strategic and decision-level control of responses during economic 
decision making. We programmed the task using the Psychophysics Toolbox version 
2.54 (Brainard, 1997) for MATLAB (MathWorks, 2011). Participants were each presented 
with 104 unique decision trials with real financial consequences presenting a choice 
between a larger amount of money to be received at a later time (e.g., $20 in 4 weeks) 
and a smaller amount of money available immediately (e.g. $19.24 NOW). Larger later 
reward magnitudes were $5, $10, $20, or $50, and delays were 1, 4, 6, or 8 weeks. 
Figure 6: Experimental tasks. a) Counting Stroop Task. Twenty-second 
blocks of neutral trials (“cat”) alternated with equal-lengthed blocks of 
incongruent trials (“two”). In both cases, partcipants pressed a button to 
indicate the number of words appearing on the screen. b) Delay Discounting 
Task. Participants viwed a two-second cue indicating the type of response 
required (choose “Want” or “Don’t Want”), followed by a five-second 
response period in which they chose between a larger delayed and smaller 
immediate option. 
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Immediate reward magnitudes were set to cover a range of discounts to the larger later 
values (from 17% lower to 1% lower) in order to manipulate the degree to which the 
immediate option was tempting. Four trials in which the immediate and later option 
magnitudes were equal were also included.  
On a typical delay DDT trial, a cue reading “Want?” would appear for two 
seconds, indicating a trial in which the participant was instructed to select their 
preferred decision option. Next, one immediate and one delayed option would appear, 
with one option on the left side of the screen and the other on the right (with side 
counterbalanced). Participants had up to five seconds to review the options and enter 
their choice by pressing either the left or right button (corresponding to the left or right 
option) on a handheld controller. In order to dissociate motor control from preferences, 
half of the trials were preceded by a “Don’t Want?” cue, which instructed subjects to 
indicate with their button press the option they did not prefer and were rejecting 
(thereby accepting the alternative). Participants completed 52 “want” and 52 “Don’t 
want” trials, divided across two eleven-minute fMRI runs. 
To motivate participants to choose in a realistic way consistent with their 
subjective preferences, we employed a mechanism to provide participants an incentive 
for truthful choice. At the end of the experiment, we randomly selected one decision trial 
from the DD task, revealed the participant’s choice for that trial, and then paid them 
according to their chosen option. Bonus payments were made in the form of electronic 
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Amazon.com credits for the exact amount chosen by the option, and, depending on the 
participants’’ choice, were either deposited immediately (e.g. $17.78 “NOW”) or after the 
chosen delay (e.g., $20, 4 weeks after the experiment). Since each decision trial had an 
equal probability of being chosen for real payment, participants were incentivized to 
choose realistically for each trial (the nature of these bonus payments were explained in 
detail prior to the start of the experiment). The average bonus payment was $20.21 with 
a range from $4.58 to $50.  
Self-Report Measures  
Participants completed a number of pen-and-paper self-report questionnaires, 
primarily measures related to impulsiveness: 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale Versions 11 (BIS-11): Responses to these 30 items were 
used to derive measures of attentional, motor, and non-planning impulsiveness subtraits 
via methods developed as a part of the ABbreviated Impulsiveness Scale, or ABIS 
(Coutlee, Politzer, Hoyle, & Huettel, 2014). We also applied the original BIS-11 scoring 
methods to derive the six first order factors (attention, motor, self-control, cognitive 
complexity, perseverance, and cognitive instability), the three second-order factors 
(attentional, motor, and non-planning impulsiveness) and the BIS-11 total score (Patton 
et al., 1995).  
Urgency, Premeditation, Perseverance, and Sensation-Seeking Scale (UPPS): The UPPS 
is a 45-item scale designed to distinguish and measure four facets of personality which 
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results in impulsive behaviors (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001). These facets are considered 
separate processes which lead to impulsive-like behavior.   
Alcohol Use Questionnaire: We asked participants to self-report the number of 
alcoholic beverages consumed on a typical day on which they drank, and also the 
average number of days per week they consumed alcohol. We used these values to 
calculate the average number of alcoholic drinks consumed per week. 
Additional Impulsiveness and Sensation Seeking Measures: We included two 
additional secondary measures of impulse-related traits: the Brief Sensation Seeking 
Scale (Hoyle et al., 2002), and the Impulsive Sensation Seeking Scale (Zuckerman, 2002). 
Behavioral Data Analysis  
“Delay premium index” predictor: We used an index reflecting the relative value of 
the larger-later reward (adjusting for the delay time) as a predictor in our behavioral and 
imaging analyses. This value was calculated for each decision trial using the hyperbolic 
delay-discounting function previously found to characterize delay discounting behavior 
(McKerchar et al., 2009; Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991). The delay premium is equal to 
((LL/SS)-1)/Delay, where “LL” and “SS” are the delayed and immediate reward 
magnitudes in dollars, and “Delay” is the delay time in weeks (Mazur, 1987). It is 
minimized at zero when the later option is equal to the immediate option, thus 
providing no incentive to accept the delayed option. As the difference between the later 
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magnitude and immediate magnitude gets smaller OR the delay time gets shorter, the 
delay premium index increases. 
Subject-by-subject delay preference estimation: We used the delay premium index for 
each trial and participant’s choices of immediate or delayed options to estimate a 
hypothetical value for the delay premium at which each participant would be indifferent 
between the immediate and delayed options (assuming a hyperbolic discounting 
function). Using MATLAB, we first calculated the delay premium index for each trial, 
and ordered them from lowest to highest delay premium. Assuming hyperbolic 
discounting and invariant preferences, a point should exist for each participant along the 
vector of delay premiums at which the value of the delay premium overcomes the 
temptation to receive immediate rewards, leading to a switch from immediate to 
delayed choices. In reality, these transitions are often noisy for a given participant, but a 
point estimate of each participants’ preference value was obtained by calculating the 
delay premium value which maximized classification accuracy for the separation of 
immediate and delayed choices (for cases in which two adjacent sampled delay 
premium values showed equal classification performance, we assigned the median of 
those two values as the participant’s delay preference). 
 We used each individual’s delay preference to estimate the subjective value of 
the delayed option for each participant on every trial. This value was used in our 
imaging models to derive both the value of the chosen option and a measure of decision 
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conflict. Decision conflict reflects the difficulty of a choice, and is largest when the 
subjective values of two options are equal, and small when one option is clearly more 
valuable than the other. For each participant, we estimated a hyperbolic discounting 
parameter which best predicted that individual’s choices across all delay discounting 
task trials (maximized classification accuracy). This value was then applied to each delay 
trial to adjust the subjective value of the delayed option based on their personal distaste 
for delay, using the hyperbolic discounting formula, where present value of a delayed 
reward is equal to the value of the delayed reward divided by 1 + k*d, where k is the 
hyperbolic discounting value and d is the delay time in weeks. The difference between 
the subjective values of the chosen and unchosen options gave a continuous measure of 
decision clarity, with the inverse of this contrast reflecting decision conflict, which 
increased as the value difference of the options approached zero, regardless of choice. 
Repeated Measures and Multilevel Modeling: For our analysis of behavioral 
responses and choices in the counting Stroop and delay discounting tasks, we 
implemented multilevel mixed-effects models for repeated measures (Snijders, 2011). 
This approach allowed us to properly account for the nested levels of sampling in our 
design (sampling of participants, followed by sampling of trials within each participant), 
in order to make valid inferences to decisions in the broader population. A key 
justification for implementing a mixed models approach was the non-normal nature of 
the dependent variables (RT’s were lognormally distributed, and choices/errors are 
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binary), as standard fixed-effects repeated measures ANOVA/regression cannot be used 
to correctly infer population effects of predictors in the case of non-normal outcome 
measures. Individual trials were treated as the “subject level” observations, while 
participants were treated as the “group level” observations. This modelling approach 
allowed us to control for the sources of dependency in our data, account for variance in 
outcomes at both the trial and participant levels, and make valid inferences regarding 
the expected size of experimental effect in the broader population. We examined 
random intercept-only models for each dependent variable order to estimate the 
intraclass correlation (participant-level variance/participant + trial level variance). The 
intraclass correlation is the proportion of total variance accounted for by clustering of 
responses by participant. These values were large for each of our dependent variables, 
demonstrating substantial participant-level variation and justifying the mixed-models 
for repeated measures approach. 
We fit generalize linear mixed models using SAS 9.3 Proc GLIMMIX (Sas 
Institute, 2011). We used residual pseudo-likelihood estimation with subject-specific 
Taylor series expansion (Breslow & Clayton, 1993). F test and denominator degrees of 
freedom were corrected using the modified Satterthwaite approximation described by 
Kenward and Roger (Kenward & Roger, 1997, 2009). We examined fixed effects by 
testing whether the omnibus test for the effect (Type III sum of squares F-test) was 
significant (with statistical significance set at the 5% level for all effects). 
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Counting Stroop Task: Our primary outcome measure for the counting Stroop task 
was response time (RT) for each trial. Response times in the counting Stroop task were 
poorly characterized by a normal distribution, but fit a lognormal distribution well. We 
thus employed multilevel generalized linear regression with a lognormal distribution 
and an identity link function to examine the effects of predictor variables on RT. 
Parameter estimates were back-transformed to dollars by raising the constant e to the 
power of the parameter estimate (i.e., the exponential, or inverse natural log function, 
eEstimate ). As a secondary consideration, we examined errors in the Stroop task (using 
multilevel logistic regression with a logit link function and binary distribution) to 
confirm expected increases in error rates for the incongruent condition (overall error 
rates are quite low for this variant of the Stroop task). Independent variables of primary 
interest included the trial condition (incongruent or neutral trial), and the ABIS 
measures of impulsiveness. Factors and covariates of no theoretical interest included 
categorical factors controlling for the number of words presented on each trial and for 
atypical behavior on the initial trial of the experiment (exceptionally slow responses). 
Delay Discounting Task: Primary outcomes of interest were the chosen option 
(immediate or delayed) and choice response time (from the time the options appeared 
until response) for each trial. We again employed a multilevel logistic regression to 
examine choice and a multilevel generalized linear model with lognormal distribution to 
examine RT. Independent variables of interest included the response condition (“Want” 
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or “Don’t Want” trial), magnitude of the immediate reward, the delay time for the later 
option, the trial’s “Delay premium index” (see Behavioral Data Analysis above for details), 
and the ABIS measures of impulsiveness. Covariates of no theoretical interest (but 
controlled for in the analysis) included practice effects on response times (indexed by the 
number of decisions previously completed).   
MRI Image Acquisition  
Functional MRI images reflecting blood-oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) 
contrast were acquired on a 3.0 Tesla General Electric scanner with an 8-channel 
receiver/head coil. We used an inverse-spiral pulse sequence for each of the three 
functional runs (330 volumes, TR = 2 s; TE = 27 ms; voxel dimensions 3.75 x 3.75 x 3.8 
mm; 34 axial AC-PC aligned slices; 64 x 64 matrix; 60° flip angle). We also acquired a 
full-brain high resolution anatomical MRI scan (T1 weighted ASSET 3D SPGR; TR = 7.48 
s; TE = 2.98 ms; voxel dimensions 1 x 1 x 1 mm; 34 axial AC-PC aligned slices; 256 x 256 
matrix; 12° flip angle) for normalizing and co-registering participants’ fMRI image data.  
 fMRI Data Preprocessing  
Preprocessing was conducted using FSL version 4.1.5 (Smith et al., 2004). 
Nonbrain voxels were removed using BET (Brain extraction tool). In-scanner head 
motion was corrected using MCFLIRT (Motion Correction using FMRIB’s Linear 
Registration Tool), with images realigned to the middle volume of the time series. We 
corrected for variations in slice-time acquisition and implemented a high-pass filter to 
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remove low-frequency drift in the MRI signal. Signal values were spatially smoothed 
across voxels using a Gaussian kernel function with a full-width at half maximum value 
of 8mm. Functional volumes were registered to high-resolution anatomical images and 
transformed into standard space (MNI stereotaxic coordinates) using FLIRT (FMRIB 
Linear Registration Tool). The first five volumes of each scan were discarded to account 
for stabilization of the magnetic field.  
fMRI Data Analysis 
 Imaging data analysis was conducted via a multilevel mixed general linear 
model procedure using FSL FEAT (FMRI Expert Analysis Tool) and FLAME (FMRIB’s 
Local Analysis of Mixed Effects) Stage 1, both a part of the FSL analysis package. For 
each image voxel, the dependent measure was BOLD contrast activation measured at 
each timepoint (0.5 Hz sampling rate), after correcting for local autocorrelation of the 
time-course. Independent variable regressors included to predict timecourse-level signal 
changes are detailed below for each task. In all cases, regressors were constructed by 
convolving a double-gamma hemodynamic response function with either boxcar-
function time blocks (a block-design, used for the counting Stroop task) or unit impulse 
functions specified at the start time of the event (an event-related design, used for the 
delay discounting task). For the delay discounting task, the two fMRI image acquisition 
runs were treated as a fixed effect. The mixed-effects analysis group level characterized 
variation in BOLD activation grouped by participants, with inferences made to a 
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broader population of possible research participants. Predictors of interest investigated 
at this higher level included participant-level individual differences (e.g. economic 
preferences, trait impulsiveness). Statistical images were thresholded at a cluster-wise 
threshold of z > 2.3 and a whole-brain cluster-corrected significance threshold of p < .05. 
MRIcron and MRIcroGL were used for visualization of 2D and 3D brain images and 
statistical overlays (Rorden & Brett, 2000), and all coordinates are reported in MNI 
standard space.  
Stroop Imaging Models: The first level (trial timecourse level) model for the 
counting Stroop task included eighteen blocks (lasting 18 seconds each) defining the 
time periods during which incongruent trials were presented. Interleaved were eighteen 
blocks (also 18 seconds each) containing neutral stimuli which were not explicitly 
modelled with a regressor, so that the intercept (mean or baseline) term reflected 
activation during the neutral Stroop condition. Two contrasts of interest were defined 
for the incongruent Stroop predictor: +1, reflecting the neural effects of incongruent 
(relative to congruent) trials, and -1, the neural effects of congruent (relative to 
incongruent) trials. Mean-centered impulsivity covariates were included as between-
subjects regressor. We first tested a model including all three ABIS scales, then 
proceeded to models with each covariate tested using a separate higher-level model.   
Delay Discounting Imaging Models: The first level (trial timecourse level) model for 
the delay discounting task included five primary regressors: The first two defined a 
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main effect of task separately for the cue and response periods, and were 1 for all 
timepoints during which the task was active, and -1 for all other timepoints. The second 
regressor defined a contrast between trials for with “Want” instructions (1) and those 
with “Don’t want” instructions (-1). The third regressor represented the subjective value 
of the chosen option (see Subject-by-subject delay preference estimation above for estimation 
details). The fourth regressor reflected “decision clarity,” and was calculated as the 
difference between the subjective values of the two options on each trial, and applied 
over the decision period. All regressors were mean centered. We defined contrasts 
reflecting each effect and its inverse: the inverse contrast of the decision clarity regressor 
reflected decision conflict present on each trial. Mean-centered impulsivity covariates 
were included as a between-subjects regressor. We first tested a model including all 
three ABIS scales, then proceeded to models with each covariate tested using a separate 
higher-level model.   
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Response conflict, caudal mPFC, and motor impulsiveness 
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We first examined behavior in the counting Stroop task to test the prediction 
from previous studies linking motor impulsiveness to individual differences in caudal 
mPFC activation. During incongruent Stroop trials, response times were slower (24ms, 
t14038 = 13.26, p < 0.0001) and errors were more frequent (odds ratio = 1.99, t14098 = 6.26, p < 
0.0001), reflecting increased response conflict and control demands compared to the 
neutral condition. Errors were rare in this variant of the Stroop (3.2% overall), so we 
focused on modelling effects on RT (Bush et al., 1998). We found no main effects of 
impulsiveness on RT (measured using the ABIS scales) but did identify an interaction 
between the ABIS motor scale and trial type (incongruent or neutral), after controlling 
for corresponding effects of the attentional and non-planning scales. Increased motor 
impulsiveness slowed response times to a significantly greater degree during 
Figure 7: Caudal mPFC activation reflecting response conflict. 
Activation within the rostral mPFC (6mm radius region of interest centered at 
x = -4, y = 10, z = 50) was correlated with the behavioral Stroop effect on 
response times (r =0.33, p < .05). 
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incongruent trials, relative to neutral trials (11ms slope difference, t14049 = 2.79, p < .01). 
The ABIS attentional and motor scales showed neither a main effect nor an interaction 
with Stroop trial type (all p’s >.09), and models using the corresponding BIS-11 (2nd order 
motor, attention, and non-planning) or UPPS scales (urgency, perseverance, and 
premeditation) failed to identify any significant relationships. The effect of motor 
impulsiveness on slowing responses was thus significantly greater under conditions of 
high response conflict.  
We next examined brain-behavior relationships during the counting Stroop task, 
and sought to connect variability in the neural Stroop effect to individual differences in 
trait motor impulsiveness. Consistent with prior metanalytic findings, BOLD activation 
showed a main effect of trial type (incongruent – neutral contrast) within the 
mPFC/ACC (Venkatraman, Rosati, et al., 2009). Additionally, individual differences in 
the behavioral Stroop effect predicted activation within an unbiased caudal mPFC ROI 
(Figure 7; r = .33, p < 0.05), replicating our previous findings linking this area to 
interindividual variability in response conflict (Venkatraman, Rosati, et al., 2009). This 
prior study also found that activation in this region was significantly related to BIS-11 
motor impulsiveness, but we found no evidence to support this claim using the ABIS, 
BIS-11, or UPPS scales.  
To identify alternative brain regions showing a relationship between the neural 
Stroop effect and impulsiveness, we conducted separate exploratory whole-brain 
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analyses with individual motor impulsiveness scales as covariates. We found reliable 
results with only one scale: the UPPS urgent impulsiveness scale, which reflects a 
tendency to experience strong, and often emotionally negative, impulses and urges 
(Whiteside & Lynam, 2001). Greater urgent impulsiveness predicted an increased neural 
Stroop effect in the precuneus and posterior cingulate cortex (Figure 8). The related 
ABIS and BIS 11 motor scales showed sub-threshold activation patterns in these same 
regions. Decoding of the urgency map using quantitative meta-analytic reverse inference 
(Yarkoni, Poldrack, Nichols, Van Essen, & Wager, 2011) showed that the regions 
associated with urgent impulsiveness were positively correlated with introspective 
cognitive networks (memory and resting state) and negatively correlated with motor 
cortex networks.   
Figure 8: UPPS urgency scores predicting neural Stroop conflict. Effects 
were present in parietal regions associated with the default mode and internally 
oriented attention. Precuneus: x = -4, y =-72 , z = 40, z-stat = 3.83. Posterior cingulate: 
x = 2, y = -38, z = 18, z-stat = 3.81.  
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 Our task design also incorporated a manipulation of response-related control 
during the delay discounting task, as participants were asked to select the option they 
preferred NOT to receive on half the trials (“Don’t Want” trials). Cognitive control 
required to overcome the overlearned, prepotent urge to select the option you desire is 
similar to control demanded by incongruent Stroop stimuli. Response times for “Don’t 
Want” trials were significantly slower than for “want” trials (123ms, t5032 = 8.82, p < 
0.0001), reflecting these control demands, although unlike in the Stroop task, we did not 
find evidence supporting an interaction with ABIS motor impulsiveness or the other 
ABIS scales (all p’s > .57). To investigate regions associated with the initiation of this 
control distinct from decision making processes, we modelled preparatory control 
during the cue period (Don’t Want – Want contrast). “Don’t Want” cues resulted in 
greater activation in a caudal mPFC region overlapping the response-conflict related 
activation observed for the Stroop task (x = -2, y =15, z = 34, z-stat = 4.51). We tested a 
model including the ABIS scales as individual differences, and found no modulation of 
Don’t-Want vs. Want activity in the mPFC (some activations occurred for motor 
impulsiveness, but were clustered within and around non-brain voxels, and may 
therefore reflect task-correlated motion artifacts associated with motor impulsiveness).      
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4.3.2 Decision conflict, rostral mPFC, and non-planning 
impulsiveness 
We next examined decisions in the delay-discounting task, with the expectation 
that decisions in a task requiring integration of more abstract context, preferences, and 
choice strategies would be sensitive to variability in attentional and non-planning 
impulsiveness. Choices during the delay discounting task were sensitive to our 
manipulations of value and delay, with smaller delay premiums (t21.94 = -5.1, p < .0001) 
and longer waiting times (t39.19 = 2.77, p < .01) increasing impatient choices. After 
controlling for the influence of the gamble structure (and individual differences in 
responses to these manipulations), we found no independent effects of the “Don’t Want” 
manipulation or ABIS motor, attentional, or non-planning impulsiveness on choice (all 
p’s > .14). Decision RT’s did show a main effect of non-planning impulsiveness, such that 
greater ABIS non-planning impulsiveness was associated with slower decisions (t45.5 = 
2.08, p < .05), reinforcing the counterintuitive relationship observed between motor 
impulsiveness and slower responses during the Stroop task.   
To examine abstract control signals reflecting the interaction of the current 
decision context with subjective preferences, we calculated a measure of decision 
conflict for each trial. Decision conflict reflects the difficulty of a choice, and is largest 
when the subjective values of two options are equal, and small when one option is 
clearly more valuable than the other. The difference between the subjective values of the 
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chosen and unchosen options gave a continuous measure of decision clarity, with the 
inverse of this contrast reflecting decision conflict, which increased as the value 
difference of the options approached zero, regardless of choice. As a manipulation check 
on the validity of the subjective value model used to derive decision conflict, we 
examined the effects of a continuous regressor reflecting the subjective expected value of 
each chosen option. Consistent with our expectations, this effect showed reward and 
choice-related activation in the bilateral ventral striatum and dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (Figure 9).  
Figure 9: Value-related choice regions correlated with subjective value. 
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Having supported our measure of subjective value, we examined decision 
conflict while controlling for the subjective value of the chosen option. Decision conflict 
was associated with mid-mPFC activation, with clusters in the anterior cingulate and BA 
8 (Figure 10). Activation reflecting decision conflict was widespread, with a caudal 
cluster overlapping the response-conflict cluster observed for the Stroop/Don’t Want 
contrasts, and a more anterior cluster extending into BA9/32, regions previously 
associated with abstract alternative choice strategies (Venkatraman, Rosati, et al., 2009). 
Finally, we examined relationships between decision conflict and individual 
differences in impulsiveness. No relationships were found between decision conflict 
signals and any of the ABIS scales, which led us to conduct an exploratory analysis 
Figure 10: Activation reflecting decision conflict in the mPFC. Activation 
reflecting conflict between similarly valued options appeared in rostral, mid, 
and caudal clusters within the mPFC. Caudal mPFC: x = -3, y =15 , z = 57, z-stat = 
3.67. Mid-mPFC: x = -3, y =19 , z = 34, z-stat = 3.34. Rostral mPFC: x = -4, y =49 , z = 
34, z-stat = 3.63. 
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including alternative measures of impulsiveness. Amongst these, we identified a 
relationship between decision conflict and BIS-11 non-planning impulsiveness in the 
right lateral PFC within the inferior frontal sulcus (Figure 11, warm colors). ABIS non-
planning showed maximum (subthreshold) activation within the same cluster. 
Activation within the inferior frontal sulcus was also influenced by individual 
differences in decision preferences, with increased impatient choice preferences 
predicting an enhanced decision conflict effect (Figure 11, cool colors). These effects did 
not appear to interact, however, as shown by whole-brain tests of the interaction 
between choice preferences and BIS-11 non-planning impulsiveness.   
Figure 11: BIS-11 non-planning (warm) and impatient choice preferences 
(cool) were correlated with activation reflecting decision conflict in the right 
inferior frontal sulcus. BIS-11: x = 40, y = 32, z = 28, z-stat = 3.4. Preferences: x = 48, y 
= 30, z = 26, z-stat = 3.9. 
z=27 
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4.4 Discussion 
Motivated by evidence supporting a medial PFC hierarchy of increasingly 
abstract control processing guiding cognitive control and decision making 
(Venkatraman, Rosati, et al., 2009), we sought to test potential relationships between 
such control signals and more concrete and abstract varieties of trait impulsiveness, 
utilizing a large neuroimaging sample and multiple measures of trait impulsiveness. 
Our results are consistent with prior findings implicating the caudal mPFC in concrete 
control over competing motor responses, and more rostral mPFC in abstract control over 
competing decision options and preferences (Bush et al., 1998; Pochon, Riis, Sanfey, 
Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008). Furthermore, we demonstrate that behavior and brain 
activation during response control is sensitive to individual differences in motor 
impulsiveness, while decision-related signals and behavior are influenced by trait non-
planning impulsiveness. We did not, however, replicate findings which suggested that 
control-related signals within the mPFC might reflect individual differences in motor, 
attentional, or non-planning impulsiveness (Venkatraman, Rosati, et al., 2009). Our 
results therefore provide evidence supporting the relevance of trait impulsiveness 
measures to the control of behavior during laboratory tasks of response control and 
patience during decision making, and address questions regarding the mechanisms by 
which impulsive traits operate to influence behavior. 
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Activation of the mPFC has been consistently associated with signaling control 
demands, during both cognitive and decision making tasks (Botvinick, 2007). Although 
we reproduce findings demonstrating caudal response-related control and more rostral 
decision-related control, it was lateral-frontal and parietal brain regions associated with 
implementing controlled behavior (Badre & D'Esposito, 2007) or an explicit absence of 
control (Fox et al., 2005) that showed control-related activity that covaried with 
impulsiveness. mPFC is most implicated in the signaling of control demands (Botvinick 
et al., 2001; MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000), with executive fronto-parietal 
networks thought to implement ongoing control of behavior in proportion to the 
signaled demand (Kerns et al., 2004; Vincent, Kahn, Snyder, Raichle, & Buckner, 2008). 
Our results, though preliminary, suggest that trait motor and non-planning 
impulsiveness may represent failures of control implementation, as opposed to failures 
to detect and signal the need for cognitive control to resolve conflict. Our inferences 
about possible processing loci underlying impulsiveness are qualified, however, by the 
inconsistent nature of our trait findings, which involved relationships with the ABIS 
motor and non-planning (behavior), UPPS urgency (response conflict), and BIS-11 non-
planning (decision conflict) scales. Consistency of individual difference findings within a 
study may be unrealistic at such moderate sample sizes, emphasizing the need for 
independent replication of these effects. An excellent confirmatory test of our 
predictions, however, would be to inhibit control-implementation using 
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neurostimulatory manipulation methods, and observe the impacts on behavior and 
decision making in individuals high and low in impulsive traits (Chapter 5 of this 
dissertation describes our study reporting such a manipulation of an inferior frontal 
sulcus region linked to both attentional impulsiveness and risk taking during economic 
decision making).  
At the most concrete level of control examined here, our results provide evidence 
linking behavioral performance, brain activation, and self-reported motor impulsiveness 
during a Stroop task requiring participants to overcome response conflict. Responses to 
incongruent Stroop trials were slowed to a greater extent as ABIS motor impulsiveness 
increased, possibly due to greater difficulty in overcoming urges to initiate the tempting 
but incorrect conflicting response (Logan et al., 1997). These results run counter to the 
expectation that impulsiveness might tend to speed responses, but are consistent with 
the effect of motor impulsiveness in other experimental tasks of cognitive control and 
response inhibition (Enticott, Ogloff, & Bradshaw, 2006; Keilp, Sackeim, & Mann, 2005). 
These results support an interpretation of motor impulsiveness as primarily reflecting 
difficulty in controlling unwanted urges (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001)  as opposed to a 
general hyperactivity of motor responses (Aron, 2011; Nigg, 2001). 
Our fMRI findings confirm the relevance of motor impulsiveness for control of 
behavior during the Stroop task, albeit not, as hypothesized, within the caudal mPFC. 
Consistent with prior findings, Stroop conflict led to widespread activation within the 
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medial cingulate cortex, including the caudal mPFC, where activation was associated 
with individual differences in the behavioral Stroop effect on response times (Bush et al., 
1998). Our previous results (Venkatraman, Rosati, et al., 2009) found activation within 
this caudal mPFC cluster to be positively correlated with BIS-11 motor impulsiveness, a 
finding we failed to confirm here, with a substantially larger sample size and alternative 
measures of motor impulsiveness (ABIS motor and UPPS Urgency). We did, however, 
identify a significant correlation between Stroop activation and UPPS Urgency (with 
ABIS and BIS-11 motor showing similar sub-threshold results) in a set of brain 
associated with internally generated attention, the resting state, and explicitly not with 
sensory-motor regions (Fransson & Marrelec, 2008; Raichle et al., 2001). Previous studies 
have shown that the balance of activation between task-positive external and task-
negative internal orientation networks can predict lapses in attention and performance 
on experimental test of cognitive control (Weissman, Roberts, Visscher, & Woldorff, 
2006). Here, the increased resting activity during incongruent trials experienced by 
individuals high in urgent impulsivity may reflect their difficulty or delay in mobilizing 
the executive resources necessary to respond correctly in the face of a more natural (but 
incorrect) response. Efficiency in transitioning between task positive and task negative 
networks has previously been linked to individual differences in response times in tests 
of cognitive control using the flanker task (Kelly, Uddin, Biswal, Castellanos, & Milham, 
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2008). Our results extend this finding by suggesting further links between individual 
differences in network activation states and self-reported behavioral traits. 
We also included a manipulation intended to dissociate motor impulsiveness 
from attentional and non-planning impulsiveness during the delay discounting task. By 
requiring participants to select a “Don’t Want” option, we sought to prevent uninhibited 
approach of rewards to obscure impulsive decision making processes. Consistent with 
prior results, however, we found no effect of the “Don’t Want” manipulation on choices, 
although response times were slower in this condition (Mitchell et al., 2005). Consistent 
with our interpretation of this manipulation as requiring the activation of response 
control resources, we found greater caudal mPFC activation during the cue phase for 
“Don’t Want” trials in a region which overlapped the region associated with Stroop 
conflict. We did not observe any activation differences in the response phase of the task, 
nor did the cue, response, or behavioral RT effects correlate with any ABIS scale. Since 
impulsive responses are influenced by time pressure (Keilp et al., 2005), providing the 
opportunity to engage proactive control during the cue phase may have dampened 
potential effects of individual differences in motor impulsiveness on responses during 
“Don’t Want” trials (Braver, 2012). 
We hypothesized that decision making during delay discounting, a procedure 
commonly employed as a laboratory measure of impulsive decision making, would 
show influences of trait attentional and non-planning impulsiveness (de Wit et al., 2007; 
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Mitchell et al., 2005). Intertemporal choice, which requires integrating contextual 
information with preferences in order to evaluate and select between competing options, 
requires contingent control over action selection incorporating multiple abstract levels 
(Badre & D'Esposito, 2007). We found no evidence for relationships between choice 
behavior and attentional impulsiveness, but did identify effects of non-planning 
impulsiveness on decision speed and right lateral prefrontal activation due to decision 
conflict. Signals reflecting competition between options of similar value produced 
widespread activation in mid-to-rostral mPFC (Figure 10), but showed no evidence of 
modulation by trait impulsiveness. 
Across these findings, we find support for our conceptualization of 
impulsiveness subtypes as relevant to behavior at particular and distinct levels of 
complexity and abstraction: concrete motor impulsiveness influenced response control, 
while abstract non-planning impulsiveness influenced patient decision making. 
Previous studies designed to relate self-reported impulsiveness to similar laboratory 
tasks have shown inconsistent results (Reynolds et al., 2006). We suspect that impulsive 
traits tend to influence behavior most prominently when effortful cognitive control is 
only weakly engaged, posing challenges for its investigation using laboratory tasks with 
clear control demands. Consistent with this possibility, our tasks elicited choices that 
were not influenced by impulsive traits, although response time measures were sensitive 
enough to detect slower decisions and responses from more impulsive individuals 
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under demanding conditions. Manipulations which limit control resources, such as 
substantial time pressure (Keilp et al., 2005), invoking more powerful pre-potent urges 
(Logan et al., 1997), or requiring divided attention through dual-tasking (Hinson, 
Jameson, & Whitney, 2003)  are likely to induce more robust effects of impulsiveness on 
behavior. On the decision making front, our incentive design may have presented an 
obstacle to observing relationships with impulsiveness, as about one third of our sample 
was at or near the limit for patient preferences, while another third of participants were 
at or near the limit of sampled impatient preferences. This censoring limited the 
accuracy with which we could represent subjective preferences for delayed options, and 
decreased the behavioral variability available for explanation by trait impulsiveness. 
This may have outweighed a distinct benefit of our task, which was that participants 
received real bonus payments based on their decisions. Adaptive decision tasks which 
personalize gambles to match the subjective preferences of the participant provide a way 
to overcome these limitations, enhancing both the power of the investigation and the 
potential influence of impulsiveness by maximizing decision conflict (Kable & Glimcher, 
2007; Peters & Büchel, 2009). 
Overall, our findings provide evidence linking impulsive traits with response 
and decision control, and qualify prior hypotheses regarding relationships between 
impulsiveness and mPFC activation. Instead, lateral prefrontal regions associated with 
the ongoing implementation of control or transitions between task-positive and task-
 107 
negative activation states may be important neural correlates of trait impulsiveness. 
Further investigation should seek to confirm these findings and extend our 
understanding of the mechanisms by which impulsive traits express as problematic 
behaviors. 
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5. Safe but sorry: Reduced calculated risk-taking 
following disruption of the intraparietal sulcus 
As with decision making for delayed rewards (examined in Chapter 4), 
individuals tend to discount rewards which are uncertain, meaning that there is only a 
chance they will be received. Such risk-aversion can be costly, as most individuals avoid 
riskier options, even when those options offer greater overall (or long-term) benefits 
(Christopoulos, Tobler, Bossaerts, Dolan, & Schultz, 2009; Holt & Laury, 2002) . Using 
fMRI, our laboratory previously found that individual differences in willingness to 
overcome risk aversion and accept lucrative but uncertain options predicted activation 
in lateral parietal and prefrontal regions associated with cognitive control  (Brass & von 
Cramon, 2004; Huettel et al., 2006b). Activation within lateral PFC also showed a 
preliminary association with attentional impulsiveness. Furthermore, this activation 
overlapped the lateral PFC decision conflict activation associated with non-planning 
impulsiveness identified in Chapter 4. Drawing from these suggestive findings, in this 
chapter, we apply causal confirmatory methods to investigate the role of a fronto-
parietal control network in irrational risk-aversion during uncertain decision making. 
Our use of neurostimulatory methods to test predictions from a prior fMRI study 
reinforces the exploratory-confirmatory methodology highlighted throughout this 
dissertation  (Pascual-Leone, Walsh, & Rothwell, 2000; Schutter, Van Honk, & Panksepp, 
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2004). Our experiment reveals clear neurobiological control mechanisms supporting 
beneficial long-term decision making in the face of tempting safe alternatives.  
5.1 Introduction 
Decision making is often characterized by the need to make difficult tradeoffs 
between uncertain risks and rewards. Although excessive risk-seeking can be 
problematic (Yates, 1992), investors and economists have long recognized that obtaining 
greater rewards typically requires accepting greater risk (Markowitz, 1952). An 
overabundance of caution can actually threaten the achievement of long-term financial 
goals such as retirement and homeownership (Bajtelsmit & VanDerhei, 1997), and 
excessive aversion to uncertainty can lead to missed opportunities like turning down a 
job that requires moving to a new city. Success, in both business and life, often depends 
on our willingness to take a “calculated risk”: to weigh potential risks against possible 
rewards, and subsequently select a risky course of action with an expectation of greater 
future gain. Here, we investigated the dependence of calculated-risk taking on two 
regions previously implicated in decision making under uncertainty: the intraparietal 
sulcus (IPS) and the inferior frontal junction (IFJ). Evidence from functional 
neuroimaging studies has shown that the IPS and IFJ are both activated by uncertainty, 
and that preferences for economic risk (“known unknowns,” e.g., a 50% chance of $5) 
and ambiguity (“unknown unknowns,” i.e., an unknown chance of $5) are dissociably 
related to activation of the IPS and IFJ, respectively (Bach, Hulme, Penny, & Dolan, 2011; 
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Huettel et al., 2006b). Whether processing in these regions influences calculated-risk 
taking for individual decisions, however, remains unknown.  
5.2 Results and discussion 
To address this question, fifteen participants each received three fifteen-minute 
sessions of MRI-guided 1Hz inhibitory (Chen et al., 1997) repetitive transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (rTMS) over the IPS, IFJ, and a vertex control site (Figure 12a). 
After each rTMS treatment, we examined participants’ risk-taking behavior across a 
series of decision trials with real financial consequences, each pitting a small, certain 
reward ($3-$7) against a larger but uncertain reward ($5-$100) (Figure 12b). Uncertainty 
was either “risky” (25%, 50%, or 75% chance of reward) or “ambiguous” (unknown 
chance of reward). We analyzed the effects of rTMS location on choices and response 
times for these decisions using a multilevel mixed-models approach for repeated 
measures with 165 unique decision trials paired across rTMS runs and nested within 
participants, treating both decisions and participants as random (as opposed to fixed) 
effects, and correcting statistical tests and degrees of freedom (Kenward & Roger, 2009). 
Our design thus allowed us to draw causal inferences regarding the role of IPS and IFJ 
in calculated-risk taking under both risk and ambiguity. 
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We hypothesized that, compared to control rTMS, inhibition of the IPS would 
reduce calculated risk-taking for risky choices, while IFJ inhibition would similarly 
affect ambiguous choices. Our results confirmed our hypothesis for IPS stimulation, 
which biased choices towards superficially safer but financially detrimental certain 
Figure 12: Experimental design. (a) For each participant, rTMS stimulation was 
applied to three targets: the left IPS (-36, -57, 50), right IFJ (39, 16, 33), and between the 
cerebral hemispheres at vertex (0, -28, 90) as an active control. Targets were based on 
group level fMRI contrasts from our previous investigation of risk and ambiguity 
preferences, and were located within each participant using their structural MRI scan 
from an earlier session. (b) Participants chose between a certain option (known 
outcome, left circles) and either a risky option (top right circle, known chances but 
unknown outcome) or an ambiguous option (bottom right circle, unknown chances 
and outcome). The expected value for the risky and ambiguous options exceeded that 
of the certain option by a variable amount. Participants completed 165 matched trials 
after each rTMS treatment.  
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options within the 50% probability condition (F6,6907 = 2.43, P < 0.05; Figure 13). For 50% 
trials, IPS stimulation increased the probability of choosing the certain option by 32% 
(95% CI [13%, 50%], t6907 = 3.43, P <0.001). This effect had meaningful financial 
consequences: the expected value of chosen options was 5% lower after IPS stimulation 
Figure 13: IPS stimulation disrupts calculated risk-
taking. Inhibition of IPS using rTMS biased risky choices on 
50% probability trials towards the safer but less profitable 
certain option, relative to matched choices in the vertex rTMS 
condition. Positive values indicate the extent to which the 
number of switches from risky options (during vertex rTMS) to 
safe options (during IPS rTMS) was greater than switches in 
the opposite direction. A null effect of rTMS on choice would 
thus hover close to zero. All bars indicate means ± SE.     
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(t4119 = -4.1, p < 0.0001), reflecting an expected loss of $15.30 across all 50% trials. The 
specificity of this effect to the 50% probability trials is consistent with previous decision 
making results showing maximal rTMS effects at intermediate choice probabilities 
(Figner et al., 2010b). IFJ stimulation, by contrast, produced no reliable effect on choices 
(all Ps  0.10-0.52). 
To gain further insight into this disruption of calculated risk-taking, we 
examined response times (RT), which are better suited to revealing subtle influences of 
rTMS on the efficiency of information processing(Luber & Lisanby, 2014). The effects of 
rTMS location on RT for the 25%, 50%, and 75% probabilities were similar in magnitude 
and direction (interaction F4,5637 = 0.6, P = 0.66), so we collapsed these trials into a single 
“risky decision” category. Our subsequent analysis showed a main effect of rTMS 
location on RT (F2,4676 = 7.18, P < 0.0001), which was qualified by a three-way interaction 
of rTMS location, trial type (risky or ambiguous), and chosen option (certain or 
uncertain; F2,6895 = 3.81, P < 0.05). IPS stimulation did not affect RTs for ambiguous trials, 
but the effect of IPS stimulation on risky trial RTs was moderated by the chosen outcome 
(t6892 = 4.01, P < 0.0001; Figure 14). Specifically, IPS stimulation slowed choices of the 
uncertain option (Δ RT = 52 ms, +5.64%, 95% CI [2.11%, 9.29%], t5116 = 3.16, P < 0.01), but 
trended towards facilitating or speeding up choices of the certain option (Δ RT = -27 ms, -
2.88%, 95% CI [-5.76%, .09%], t4421 = -1.9, P < 0.06). No other contrasts showed evidence of 
decision speeds faster than their corresponding vertex control. By comparison, IFJ 
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stimulation resulted in a general disruption of decision processing slowing choices 
across all trial types (Δ RT = 52 ms, +5.59%, 95% CI [2.61%, 8.66%], t5148 = 3.73, P < 0.001).  
Effective decision makers are capable of accepting uncertainty when it improves 
their chances to achieve a valued goal. Our study provides the first causal evidence 
differentiating parietal and frontal contributions to such calculated risk-taking. 
Figure 14: Inhibition of IPS biases response 
times for risky trials. After IPS stimulation, certain 
choices were speeded, while risky choices were 
slowed. All bars indicate means ± SE.     
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Inhibiting IPS activity reduces risk-taking – at a cost to earnings – for decisions with 
known risks but uncertain outcomes. Given our previous results linking IPS activation 
to risk preferences (Huettel et al., 2006b), we interpret IPS inhibition as biasing risk (but 
not ambiguity) preferences towards certainty; this slows selection of risky options, 
speeds selection of certain options (Figure 2b) and reduces risk-taking behavior (Figure 
2a). IPS may represent or modify the subjective probability (and thereby subjective 
utility) of risky options in a manner independent of utility calculations for ambiguous 
choices (Camerer & Weber, 1992; Dorris & Glimcher, 2004; Peters & Büchel, 2009). By 
contrast, despite previous evidence linking IFJ activation with ambiguity preferences 
(Bach et al., 2011; Huettel et al., 2006b), our RT results support a largely general role for 
IFJ in decision making under uncertainty. Recent findings suggest that although IFJ is 
engaged by the presence of ambiguity, its activity does not scale with increasing 
ambiguity (Bach et al., 2011). Ambiguity may be linked to IFJ through general processes 
of control based on contextual information (Brass & von Cramon, 2004; Koechlin, Ody, 
& Kouneiher, 2003b). Our results are the first to demonstrate the necessity of IPS 
activation for risk-taking (Helfinstein et al., 2014; Huettel, Song, & McCarthy, 2005; 
Peters & Büchel, 2009; Platt & Huettel, 2008b) and complement rTMS results showing 
increased risk-taking and impulsivity following inhibition of prefrontal self-control 
processes (Figner et al., 2010b; Knoch, Gianotti, et al., 2006; Knoch, Pascual-Leone, 
Meyer, Treyer, & Fehr, 2006b). The present findings suggest that engagement of IPS 
 116 
during calculated risk-taking may spell the difference between bold “playing to win” 
and passive “playing not to lose.” 
5.3 Methods 
Participants 
 Fifteen adults (six female) recruited from the Durham, North Carolina and Duke 
University communities participated in the experiment, which included both anatomical 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(rTMS) procedures. Participants were screened for both MRI and rTMS eligibility, for the 
latter, following established guidelines (Rossi, Hallett, Rossini, & Pascual-Leone, 2009, 
2011). All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision, and reported no history 
of psychiatric or neurological disorders. Participants received $20 per hour in 
compensation, plus additional payments based on decision made during the task. All 
study procedures were approved by the Duke University Medical Center institutional 
review board.  
Study Procedure 
Each participant completed separate one-hour MRI imaging and three-hour 
rTMS studies. Anatomical scans from the MRI session were used for personalized 
neuronavigated targeting during the rTMS study. Prior to receiving rTMS, participants 
were screened, familiarized with the study equipment, and procedure, and trained on 
the task. Participants then completed a full paid practice run of the decision making task 
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prior to receiving any rTMS stimulation. Immediately prior to the first rTMS treatment, 
stimulation strength was calibrated by measuring their personal motor evoked potential 
threshold.  
We conducted a within-subjects experiment in which each participant received 
two rTMS treatments: one to the right inferior frontal junction (IFJ) and one to the left 
intraparietal sulcus (IPS). Participants also received an active-control session of rTMS to 
the interhemispheric fissure at vertex, for a total of three rTMS sessions per participant 
(order of TMS stimulation sites was counter-balanced over participants). Each session 
consisted of 15 minutes of 1 Hz inhibitory (Chen et al., 1997) rTMS applied over the 
brain region of interest. After each session of rTMS, participants immediately completed 
a run (165 decision trials) of the decision making task. There was a resting period of 
about 10 minutes after each run of the task to minimize carryover effects. 
After completing the three rTMS sessions, participants were debriefed, screened 
to insure intact basic cognitive function, and completed a few brief questionnaires. 
Participants were contacted one day after the rTMS session, and reported no discomfort 
or medical complications from the study.  
Anatomical MRI Scan Acquisition  
For the MRI session, participants completed a high-resolution anatomical MRI; 
these images were used for subject-specific targeting of rTMS administration in this 
study. A functional MRI task examining cognitive control was collected, but considered 
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in a separate study. Anatomical imaging was conducted on a 3.0 Tesla GE Discovery 
MR750 system using an eight-channel head coil. Anatomical images were acquired 
using a T1-weighted FSPGR scan in the axial plane with a 3D inversion recovery 
prepared sequence (120 slices, 1mm slice thickness, 1x1mm in-plane resolution).   
Repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (rTMS)  
Each participant received three 15-minute, 900-pulse trains of 1 Hz rTMS applied 
at an intensity of 100% of their resting motor threshold using a Magstim Rapid2 
stimulator with a Magstim Double 70mm Air Film Coil (The Magstim Company 
Limited, Whitland, Dyfed, UK). Motor threshold was determined for each participant 
using electromyographic recording of the dorsal interosseus muscle of the right hand. 
Following standard procedures (Rossi et al., 2009; Rossini et al., 1994), motor threshold 
was defined as the lowest percentage of maximum stimulator output required to evoke 
at least 5 out of 10 motor-evoked potentials with peak-to-peak amplitude of at least 
50 µV. Stimulation was conducted with the coil positioned tangential to the skull, 
perpendicular to underlying gyral/sulcal brain anatomy, and with the coil head more 
anterior and coil handle more posterior. 
Neuronavigated rTMS targeting 
 rTMS was applied to three anatomical locations: the left intraparietal sulcus 
(IPS), the right inferior frontal junction (IFJ), and the interhemispheric fissure at the 
brain vertex. We employed a neuronavigated rTMS approach in order to accurately 
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target functional loci within these brain regions previously implicated in risky and 
ambiguous decision making. Standardized MNI coordinates for the IPS (-36,-57,50) and 
IFJ (39,16,33) were based on peak group activations associated with risk and ambiguity 
preferences in our previous fMRI study(Huettel et al., 2006b). MNI coordinates for the 
vertex active control site (0,-28,90) were determined by selecting the coordinates falling 
most directly over the interhemispheric fissure at the peak of the standardized MNI 
brain. 
We identified these target coordinates for each participant using their structural 
MRI scan and a neuronavigated rTMS procedure implemented using the Brainsight 
suite of tools and software (Rogue Research, Montreal, Canada). Each participant’s 
anatomical MRI image was mapped to MNI standard space based on manual 
registration landmarks (anterior commissure, posterior commissure, brain size and 
edges), allowing rTMS targets defined in MNI coordinates to be translated to each 
individual’s native brain anatomy. Next, we co-registered our participants’ cranial 
features with their anatomical MRI scans, using the left and right intertragal notch, 
nasion, and tip of nose. This allowed us to target the IPS, IFJ, and vertex consistently 
within individual participants. Participants were re-registered prior to each rTMS 
administration to insure accurate administration. 
Decision-Making Task 
 120 
On each trial, participants made self-paced choices with real financial 
consequences between a certain option (e.g. 100% chance of $5) and a risky (e.g., 50% 
chance of $12) or ambiguous (e.g., ??% chance of $12) option. Participants were 
instructed that the winning probability for ambiguous options was hidden, but could 
take any value from 0 to 100%. We manipulated the certain option reward amount ($3-
$7), uncertain option reward amount ($2-$98) and the degree of option uncertainty (75%, 
50%, 25%, or ??%) to reveal subjective preferences (or degree of aversion) for risk and 
ambiguity. From these variables, we constructed 165 unique gamble trials (45 each for 
25%, 50% 75% risk, and 30 for ambiguity), which constituted a single run of the task. 
This identical set of 165 gambles was repeated for each task run, allowing repeated 
measures comparisons with subject, gamble, and subject-by-gamble effects controlled. 
The vast majority of these gambles (150 out of 165) were constructed such that the 
uncertain option had a higher expected value than the certain option. The ratio of the 
uncertain vs. the certain expected value (assuming ambiguous options to have an 
expected probability of .5) ranged from 0.5 to 3.6. The higher end of this range was 
covered by the ambiguous and 25% gambles to sufficiently reward risk taking, as 
participants are typically strongly risk-averse to such gambles. By contrast, the 75% 
gambles covered the lower end of this range, with 50% gambles intermediate to these 
extremes.  
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To provide participants an incentive to choose according to their preferences, we 
explained that for each run of the task (165 gamble trials) we would randomly select one 
trial, resolve the gamble according to their choice, and pay them the winnings from that 
trial. Participants completed four runs of the task (initial run followed by three rTMS 
treatment runs) and were thus paid for a total of four such bonus trials. The average 
bonus compensation per run was $9.61, or $38.43 per participant (actual range of total 
bonus received was $8 to $125).  
Data Analysis: Primary Study Measures  
The dependent variables of primary interest for our study were choice and 
decision time, both examined at the trial level. Choice reflects whether the certain or 
uncertain option was selected for a trial, while decision time measures how long it took 
from the time the options appeared for a choice to be entered. We used multilevel 
logistic regression with a logit link function and binary distribution to analyze choice, 
and multilevel generalized linear regression with a lognormal distribution and an 
identity link function to analyze decision times. We also examined the financial 
consequences of participants’ choices by computing the expected value of the chosen 
option for each trial.  
Independent variables of primary interest included the rTMS treatment 
condition (vertex, IFJ, or IPS), the difference of uncertain and certain option reward 
magnitudes (continuous), the uncertain option probability (25%, 50%, 75%, or 
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ambiguous), and the interactions of these variables. Variables included in our models 
but not of primary interest were a categorical variable reflecting the rTMS condition 
order (controlling for order effects), and in the decision time model, a continuous 
variable reflecting the total number of trials already completed (controlling for practice 
effects). 
Repeated Measures and Multilevel Modeling 
We implemented multilevel mixed-effects models for repeated measures 
(Snijders, 2011) in order to account for non-independent observations due to both our 
design (165 unique gambles repeated across three rTMS treatments) and subject effects 
(individual differences in risk/ambiguity aversion and average decision speed). The 165 
unique gambles were treated as the “subject level” observations (with three observations 
for each), while participants were treated as the “group level” observations. This 
modelling approach allowed us to control for the sources of dependency in our data, 
account for variance in the data at both the decision trial and participant levels 
simultaneously, and make valid inferences regarding the expected size of the rTMS 
effect in the broader population. These models also allowed the simultaneous 
examination of trial-varying effects (such as practice effects on decision speed, which 
evolve through time) and participant-varying effects (such as broader preference or 
personality trait influences on decisions). We examined null models (random intercept, 
no trial-level regressors) for our dependent variables in order to estimate the intraclass 
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correlation (participant-level variance/participant + trial level variance). This value 
reflects the proportion of total variance accounted for by clustering of responses by 
participant. As these values were large for each of our dependent variables (indicating a 
violation of the independence assumption), a mixed model approach was justified.  
We fit models using SAS 9.3 Proc GLIMMIX (Sas Institute, 2011), which 
implements generalized linear mixed models. Models were estimated using residual 
pseudo-likelihood estimation with subject-specific Taylor series expansion (Breslow & 
Clayton, 1993). The residual degrees of freedom were determined using the improved F 
approximation procedure described by Kenward and Roger (Kenward & Roger, 1997, 
2009). To avoid unnecessary statistical comparisons between conditions, we restricted 
our examination of significant effects in two ways. First, we restricted our pairwise 
comparisons to the examination of rTMS treatment effects, always matching other model 
factors across comparisons (i.e., comparing choices on the 50% trials between control, 
IFJ, and IPS rTMS, but not comparing the 50% and 25% conditions). Secondly, we 
conducted such comparisons only for cases in which the omnibus test for the effect 
(Type III sum of squares F-test) was significant (with statistical significance set at the 5% 
level for all effects).        
An advantage of a multilevel models approach to repeated measures is that 
missing-at-random observations are permissible. Data was missing from three runs in 
our study: one participant declined to complete the IFJ rTMS condition, and data from 
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two other runs (one IFJ, one vertex) was deemed unreliable because neuronavigated 
targeting failed in the midst of the rTMS administration. Observations from the 
successful runs with these participants are included in the analysis, while these 
unsuccessful runs were coded as missing observations. These missing runs slightly 
altered the treatment order counterbalancing. We controlled for the potential impact of 
this imbalance by including the order of treatment effects as a categorical variable in our 
analysis (“rTMS Condition Order”), and observed no substantive change in our results. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this concluding chapter, I review the key findings and contributions presented 
by this dissertation, highlight some limitations of our research findings as well as our 
current understanding of impulse control, and suggest areas for future investigation. 
6.1 Summary of contributions  
Chapter 1 compares and contrasts decision neuroscience and cognitive control 
approaches to flexible behavior. These research domains stand to benefit from an 
emerging approach that integrates theory and techniques from both research domains. 
This chapter introduces one potential point of contact between these literatures, based 
on models describing a hierarchical stream of control processing within the medial and 
lateral prefrontal cortex. The anatomical organization of cognitive control over concrete, 
short term, and long-term levels of abstraction may provide an organizing principle 
useful for understanding a variety of processes dependent on this control, including 
decision making and impulse control. The integration of cognitive, personality, and 
decision scientific approaches to behavioral control provides the intellectual foundation 
for the subsequent empirical work described in Chapters 2 through 5. 
Chapter 2 presents evidence from exploratory factor models supporting the 
organization of impulsive personality (measured using the prominent BIS-11 scale) into 
motor, attentional, and non-planning components. Previous models attempting to 
measure these factors were found to lack coherence, leading us to reevaluate, revise, and 
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abbreviate the original measure substantially. The resulting ABbreviated Impulsiveness 
Scale, or ABIS, maintains conceptual focus and internal consistency with far fewer items, 
provides a substantially more versatile measure, and remains true to the primary 
impulsiveness subtypes originally identified by Barratt, Patton, and colleagues (Patton et 
al., 1995). The ABIS scales thus represent a data-driven improvement upon the world’s 
most widely employed measure of impulsiveness. 
Chapter 3 extends the utility of the ABIS, demonstrating its replicability, 
generalizability, and validity for measuring attentional, motor, and non-planning 
impulsiveness. Psychological science has faced recent challenges in regards to unreliable 
findings, an issue which is particularly important for results intended for widespread 
application, such as personality scales. The ABIS, in contrast to its BIS-11 forebear, 
demonstrated consistent results when replicated in an independent sample. The ABIS 
also generalized well to a third independent internet sample collected from a 
substantially different population of respondents. Finally, the ABIS showed evidence of 
validly measuring attentional, motor, and non-planning impulsiveness subtypes, and 
clearly reproduced relationships between motor impulsiveness and alcohol 
consumption. Evidence from Chapter 3 strongly reinforces the conclusions from Chapter 
2, demonstrating the superior stability and predictive utility of inference based on the 
ABIS. 
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Chapter 4 integrated behavioral, brain, and trait measures of impulse control at 
concrete and abstract levels, addressing the question of whether the structure of 
cognitive control, decision making, and trait impulsiveness each depend on a common 
principle of abstraction. Individual differences in motor impulsiveness were found to 
relate to brain activation during a Stroop task requiring inhibitory control over a pre-
potent but incorrect motor response. Specifically, increased activity in a resting-state 
network was associated with urgent impulsiveness. By contrast, more abstract control 
over competing decision options in a delay-discounting task was associated with 
nonplaninng impulsiveness, particularly in a region of right lateral PFC implicated  in 
contextual control. These results qualify hypothesized relationships between medio-
lateral control networks and impulsiveness, suggesting that motor and non-planning 
impulsiveness may manifest as variable activation within regions associated with the 
implementation of actions and control, as opposed to  in medial PFC regions engaged in 
the detection of conflict.  
Chapter 5 employs experimental neurostimulatory techniques to investigate 
causal contributions of contextual and impulse-control regions to calculated risk-taking. 
Although risk-taking behavior is often negatively construed within the psychological 
sciences, an ability to accept uncertainty for the chance to obtain a highly valued 
outcome is essential to successful decision making. The results of this study revealed a 
general involvement of a prefrontal contextual control region associated with attentional 
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impulsiveness in the processing of uncertain decisions. By contrast, an intraparietal 
region associated with cognitive control, numeric processing, and risk preferences 
showed a specific involvement in calculated risk-taking: inhibiting this parietal brain 
region biased choices away from uncertainty and towards safety, to the financial 
detriment of the decision maker. This study further reinforced the neural dissociation of 
risky and ambiguous decision uncertainty, and, more importantly, provided the first 
evidence supporting a causal role for the left intraparietal sulcus in calculated risk-
taking decisions. 
6.2 Present questions and future research 
The research presented as a part of this thesis has considered impulse control as 
a phenomenon observable at neurobiological, behavioral, and trait levels of analysis. 
Our findings regarding the organization of trait impulsiveness anchor our empirical 
results by describing the development and application of the ABIS scales. These 
measures link our subsequent empirical investigations of alcohol use, cognitive control, 
decision making, and risk-taking. Impulsiveness has been typically operationalized at 
the trait level, and has a rich history as construct of interest in both theoretical and 
applied research (Dickman, 1990; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1978; Moeller et al., 2001; Petry, 
2001; Whiteside & Lynam, 2009). Despite this relevance, important questions remain 
regarding the nature of trait impulsiveness, its subtypes, varieties, and correlates, and 
even its very existence as an independent personality construct. 
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6.2.1 Defining trait impulsiveness 
Two influential but distinct approaches to impulsiveness come from Barratt and 
colleagues (Barratt, 1965; Barratt & Patton, 1983; Patton et al., 1995) and Whiteside, 
Lynam and colleagues (Lynam & Miller, 2004; Miller, Flory, Lynam, & Leukefeld, 2003; 
Whiteside & Lynam, 2001; Whiteside et al., 2005). Baratt’s perspective on impulsiveness 
and his approach to measuring it have evolved over fifty years of research. His measure 
(currently the BIS-11), by far the most widely utilized impulsiveness scale, has an 
outsized influence on the way impulsiveness is studied across a variety of behavioral 
fields. At its core, Baratt’s modern conceptualization of impulsiveness describes a set of 
interrelated but distinct sub-traits, distinct from related action-oriented constructs such 
as sensation-seeking, risk-taking, and extroversion (Stanford et al., 2009). This 
perspective recognizes the multi-dimensionality of impulsiveness while distinguishing 
the construct as a whole from behaviors and traits often thought of as closely related.   
Lynam and Whiteside, by contrast, conceptualize varieties of impulsiveness not 
as subtypes of a common trait, but rather, as separable styles of behavior which produce 
a similar appearance of impulsiveness (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001). These styles emerge 
from distinct processes and facets of personality, linked to the broad five-factor theory of 
personality (McCrae & John, 1992). Thus, distinct regulatory processes (and their failure) 
produce convergent behavioral responses which produce the appearance of 
disinhibition, present-orientation, and a lack of forethought. Behavioral patterns like 
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sensation-seeking – as measured by their UPPS impulsiveness scale – are, in fact, the 
very behaviors the BIS-11 impulsiveness subtraits are thought to be distinct from. In 
contrast to the high intercorrelations of BIS-11 subtraits, the UPPS scale measures tend to 
show only low to moderate intercorrelation, consistent with Whiteside and Lynam’s 
conceptualization of independent impulse-related control processes and patterns of 
behavior emerging from distinct facets of personality. 
The results presented in this thesis support a model of trait impulsiveness and 
which allows for an integration of these opposing perspectives. A mechanistic approach 
to impulse control rooted in hierarchical models from cognitive psychology and 
neuroscience provides the basis for integrating these perspectives. The results and 
research presented and reviewed by this dissertation support the core impulsive 
subtraits hypothesized by Barratt and colleagues, but also demonstrate specific 
interrelationships between these traits and the behavioral styles measured by the UPPS 
scales of Whiteside and Lynam. Our review of cognitive neuroscience results and 
models supporting a hierarchical organization of behavioral control according to a 
principle of abstraction provides a potential explanation: Both correlated system-level 
disturbances and independent disruptions of control processing may produce 
dependent and independent patterns of self-regulatory failure. 
 Our findings in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, which detail the formulation and 
replication of the ABIS scales, clearly support Barratt and colleagues’ multidimensional 
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conceptualization of impulsiveness. Our findings are consistent with theirs in 
identifying correlated motor, attentional, and non-planning dimensions of 
impulsiveness. The ABIS scale measures, however, also show clear correspondence with 
measures of impulsive behavior from the UPPS (Chapter 3, Table 5). ABIS non-planning 
correlates preferentially with UPPS premeditation, and attentional impulsiveness (as 
well as non-planning) show clear relationships with UPPS perseverance. The 
relationship between motor impulsiveness and UPPS urgency is the most specific, 
however, and is clearly identified by the ABIS, but not the BIS-11, motor scale (Coutlee 
et al., 2014). Sensation seeking is the only UPPS scale without an ABIS/BIS-11 analogue 
(although the ABIS reveals a weak correspondence with motor impulsiveness, 
reinforced by positive results with the Brief and Impulsive Sensation Seeking Scales). 
Thus, despite their roots in opposing theoretical perspectives, our work with the ABIS 
reconciles Barratt et al. and Whiteside and Lynam’s measures of impulsive behaviors, 
particularly in regards to control in the moment (motor and urgent impulsiveness) and 
strategic control (non-planning and (lack of) premeditation impulsiveness). 
6.2.2 Varieties of impulsive behavior and hierarchical models of 
control 
Our findings from Chapters 1, 4, and 5, which present evidence from cognitive 
neuroscience supporting hierarchical concrete-to-abstract organization of control 
behavior, provide a model for understanding the mechanism through which both 
interrelated and independent impulsive traits and behaviors can emerge. According to 
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the hierarchical control perspective, control processes at different levels of abstraction 
are distinct, but linked through the influenced of higher, more abstract levels of control. 
In order to be expressed in flexible, effective behavior, these systems channel regulation 
to the primary motor output control levels in caudal PFC. Thus, the overall system is 
linked and interactive, but different forms of self-regulatory failure can result from 
disruptions to different components (brain regions or systems) affecting different control 
processes (supported by those regions and systems). This control-system perspective 
allows for the possibility of both global and local disruptions of impulse control, which 
could produce both linked subtrait-like and superficially similar but behaviorally 
independent manifestations of impulsive behavior.  
Disruptions or inefficiencies of control exercised at particular levels of 
abstraction couuld produce mechanistically distinct, but behavioral similar, patterns of 
impulsive behavior. Such patterns of distinct self-regulatory failures presenting as 
impulse-like patterns of behavior would be consistent with Whiteside and Lynam’s 
perspective on impulsiveness. Individual differences in specific regulatory processes 
could result from imbalances in control exercised at different levels of abstraction –
particularly in interaction with reward and decision making processes. For example, a 
large reward responses to novelty (nucleus accumbens) or risk-seeking preferences (IPS 
activity), if unbalanced by abstract future rewards and strategic control (rostral PFC) 
could present as sensation-seeking behavior, venturesomeness, or motor impulsiveness 
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(Abler, Walter, Erk, Kammerer, & Spitzer, 2006). Likewise, difficulty in maintaining 
focus and resisting distraction (mid-PFC) could present as attentional impulsiveness, 
diminished perseverance, or urgent impulsiveness through weakness to prepotent 
responses (Aron, 2011). Failure to engage long-term goals and stick to plans (rostral 
PFC) could lead to a reliance on reactive, rather than proactive control (Braver, Paxton, 
Locke, & Barch, 2009), a condition which encourages shortsighted decision making and 
vulnerability to instant gratification (Braver, 2012; Hinson et al., 2003). 
 In healthy self-regulatory systems, regulation implemented at different levels of 
abstraction can shore up weaknesses in other areas (Magen & Gross, 2010), but 
persistent imbalances are likely to show through as patterns of impulsive behavior, as 
measured through self-report instruments like the UPPS. Investigations of the 
potentially hierarchical mechanisms of specific control failures suggested here would 
benefit from research with individuals with lesions to different areas along the PFC axis, 
such as frontopolar patients suffering from strategy application disorder (Azuar et al., 
2014; Shallice & Burgess, 1991b) and studies deactivating these regions experimentally 
using TMS (Basso, Ferrari, & Palladino, 2010; Costa et al., 2011). These methods could 
contribute specific tests of the proposed theory that disturbances in the balance of 
control at multiple interacting levels produces a variety of disturbances, many of which 
may ultimately appear as impulsive behaviors.   
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6.2.3 Impulsive subtraits, global control, and general impulsiveness 
A regulatory system operating at multiple interacting levels of abstraction can 
also suffer disturbances that act across multiple levels simultaneously. Such 
disturbances would produce correlated disruptions of distinct but related control 
behaviors, a pattern more consistent with Barratt’s conception of correlated impulsive 
subtraits. At the global scale, for example, individual differences in the integrity or 
efficiency of processing throught the prefrontal cortex – due to polymorphism in the 
COMT gene, for instance (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2005) – or disturbed functional 
connectivity between hierarchical control regions could produce correlated, trait-like 
differences in control measured across multiple levels of abstraction. Recent research 
using graph-theoretic measures of resting-state connectivity in the brain have implicated 
prefrontal control network abnormalities in impulsiveness (Davis et al., 2013; Li et al., 
2013). System-level differences could produce global changes in self-regulatory capacity, 
and might therefore be particularly relevant and apparent in clinical disorders of 
control, such as ADHD or OCD. In such cases, the diffuse regulatory impacts of 
pharmacological interventions might be well matched to the global inefficiency of 
control processing (Konrad & Eickhoff, 2010; Robbins, Gillan, Smith, de Wit, & Ersche, 
2012; Winstanley, Eagle, & Robbins, 2006).  
   The possibility of intercorrelated global disruptions of control leads us to an 
important question regarding the nature of trait impulsiveness left unresolved by our 
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current work: is there a “general impulsiveness” that cuts across these constructs, and if 
so, what is its nature? The BIS-11 subtraits are conceptualized as multi-dimensional 
manifestations of an impulsiveness construct, and are substantially intercorrelated. That 
the ABIS measures remain highly correlated after our extensive revision of the BIS-11 is 
interesting, since this process increased the specificity and internal consistency of the 
resulting ABIS scales substantially, but did not thereby eliminate relationships between 
the scales. Our work in Chapters 2 and 3 discourages the use of existing general total 
score measures of BIS-11 impulsiveness (Coutlee et al., 2014; International Society for 
Research on Impulsivity, 2013), and we declined to present one as a part of the ABIS, 
due to the clearly multi-dimensional character of impulsiveness, and the distortions of 
inference that can occur if multidimensionality is ignored (Cattell, 1958; Fava & Velicer, 
1996). The fact remains, however, that the BIS-11 and ABIS scales are substantially 
intercorrelated, suggesting a possible general impulsiveness construct which might 
underlie the measured subtraits. So long as these intercorrelations are a component on 
responses to the BIS-11 self-report items, a psychometrically appropriate means for 
measuring and understanding that shared variation would represent a substantial and 
valuable contribution. Hierarchical models of control may contribute to advancing this 
understanding. 
Hierarchical models of control suggest the possibility that an apparent general 
impulsiveness trait could result from the cascading nature of hierarchical control. Since 
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each level of control influences all lower levels of abstraction (Koechlin et al., 2003a), 
poor planning might tend to result in poorer attention and motor control, and poor 
attentional focus might produce poor motor control. As the base output level, motor 
impulsiveness serves as a common link. This scheme would predict that levels of control 
(and impulsiveness types) adjacent in level of abstraction should show stronger 
correlations. The patterns of factor correlations observed in our ABIS model from 
Chapter 2 (Figure 4) supports this prediction, as the correlations between non-planning 
and attentional impulsiveness is strongest, followed by attentional to motor, with non-
planning and motor least correlated. This evidence is interesting but speculative, and 
future investigations designed to examine this possibility should explicitly test models 
which impose the proposed hierarchical constraints on the flow of control influence. 
Such models could be tested using mediation analysis, or more flexibly, structural 
equation modeling with directional relationships specified down the hierarchy of latent 
impulsive traits (Hoyle, 2011; Jöreskog et al., 1979). An important alternative for 
investigation would be a bi-factor structure of impulsiveness, whereby uncorrelated 
subtraits as well as a single general impulsiveness factor underlie impulsive traits and 
behaviors (Holzinger & Swineford, 1937; Jennrich & Bentler, 2011). Emerging modeling 
techniques, especially exploratory bi-factor analysis, will allow competing alternative 
hypotheses regarding the nature and importance of a potential general impulsiveness 
trait to be more thoroughly investigated.  
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6.3 Brains, traits, and behavior: limits and opportunities 
At the heart of the research described here lies an effort to explore what 
measures of individual differences in personality, preferences, and cognitive abilities can 
tell us about how the mind and the brain solve problems of self-control. More broadly, a 
key question is whether examining brain circuitry informs our understanding of 
personal characteristics, traits, and their variability across individuals. Decision 
neuroscience research questions frequently address qualities that vary markedly in the 
population, such as risk-aversion (Christopoulos et al., 2009; Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005), 
self-control (Figner et al., 2010b; Hare et al., 2009; Kable & Glimcher, 2007; McClure et 
al., 2007), reward sensitivity (Beaver et al., 2006; Hariri et al., 2006), and subjective 
preferences for particular goods (Aharon et al., 2001; Clithero, Reeck, Carter, Smith, & 
Huettel, 2011; Huettel et al., 2006b). Neuroimaging research drawing on tools and 
techniques from economics and personality psychology to estimate and examine 
individual differences in preferences and traits often addresses compelling questions. 
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize the fundamental limitations constraining an 
individual-difference approach to cognitive neuroscience, and to consider some of the 
ways these obstacles might be overcome. 
6.3.1 Introspection and insight as challenges for self-report 
It is important to acknowledge a primary limitation characterizing all forms of 
individual-difference research that relies on self-report measures of traits, preferences, 
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and personality: These measures suffer from the known failings of an introspective 
approach to knowledge. Insights from introspection are often overly optimistic (Sharot, 
Riccardi, Raio, & Phelps, 2007; Weinstein, 1980), biased (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), and incomplete reflections of the true natural state of the 
world (Baumeister, Vohs, & Funder, 2007; Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004; Wilson & 
Dunn, 2004). More insidiously, differences in self-insight may be confounded with 
groups of interest, possibly presenting as spurious group differences in impulsiveness or 
other traits (Ben-Porath, 2003; Sackeim & Gur, 1979). For example, depression or anxiety 
could encourage pessimistic self-evaluation and present as impulsiveness, or a lack of 
focus necessary for self-reflection might produce noisy “trait” measures in individuals 
with attention-deficit disorder. A related concern affects socio-economic status: 
individuals forced by their circumstances to live paycheck-to-paycheck (or even 
handout to handout) must rationally adopt a concrete, short term perspective in which 
long term planning is neglected, thereby possibly presenting as impulsive nonplanners 
due to circumstance rather than personality (Takeuchi, Williams, & Adair, 1991).  
A method which partially addresses these issues is to measure traits and preferences 
using behavioral procedures rather than through self-report alone. Behavioral 
economics, and decision neuroscience by extension, often utilize this approach, 
employing repeated-choice procedures to reveal subjective preferences for use as 
individual difference measures.  
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Awareness of the limits of self-report measures is important to the interpretation 
of findings reporting individual differences in traits and behavior. Attempts to 
generalize findings across different populations and relate self-report measures to 
measures of behavior from experimental or observational studies represent important 
steps to guard against these limitations. In the studies reported in this dissertation, we 
attempt to address these limitations by relating self-report measures of impulsiveness to 
a variety of personality constructs to demonstrate validity for measuring impulsive 
traits, as well as to measures of experimental task performance (response inhibition), 
financially consequential decisions (delay discounting), and reported outcome variables 
(alcohol consumption). 
6.3.2 Limits of the individual-difference approach to neuroimaging 
Setting aside issues of self-report, individual-difference research based on 
neuroimaging faces a serious limitation due to the high costs of obtaining anything but 
small participant-level sample sizes for neuroimaging studies. The issue is stark: sample 
sizes of below around 200 are considered small in personality psychology (Comrey & 
Lee, 2013; Guadagnoli & Velicer, 1988), but such sample sizes are still a full order of 
magnitude larger than the sample size of a typical neuroimaging studies (Desmond & 
Glover, 2002; Friston, Holmes, & Worsley, 1999). The standard neuroimaging strategy of 
collecting large quantities of noisy trial-level scanning data – which is quite effective for 
inferences regarding within-subjects experimental manipulations – provides little 
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benefit when considering the effects of between-subjects variables like personality traits. 
This leaves most analyses incorporating individual differences woefully underpowered 
and vulnerable to false positives via capitalization on chance variation (Ioannidis, 2005; 
MacCallum et al., 1992). We observed such a failure to replicate in Chapter 4 for a 
relationship between motor impulsiveness and the neural Stroop conflict effect, with the 
correlation originally estimated as r = .60 in a sample size of 20 but r = .01 our 
subsequent 49 subject attempt at replication (Ioannidis, 2005; Venkatraman, Rosati, et al., 
2009). Such false positives neuroimaging findings based on spurious relationships can 
lead to costly misallocations of limited resources by influencing experimental questions 
and study designs. 
What are some ways to address problems associated with low sample sizes in 
neuroimaging studies of individual differences? An obvious, but ultimately unrealistic 
solution, is to collect larger participant-level sample sizes. A small number of 
investigators have the opportunity to attempt this approach, with some notable 
neuroimaging samples pushing into the range of a few hundred, and on rare and limited 
occasions, a few thousand subjects (Biswal et al., 2010; Nikolova, Singhi, Drabant, & 
Hariri, 2013; Utevsky, Smith, & Huettel, 2014). Given an operational cost of fMRI 
experiments in the hundreds-to-thousands of dollars per hour range, however, large 
subject-level sample sizes are likely to remain out of reach for most cognitive 
neuroscientists and research questions. 
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More realistic possibilities involve maximizing the value of the imaging and 
individual difference measures that are already being collected. Mirroring the within-
subjects approach used to average noisy imaging data, within subject replicates of 
individual difference measurements could be taken (perhaps survey questions with 
slight wording changes) to increase the reliability of every precious individual measure 
obtained. Such close replicates are often eliminated during self-report scale design 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003), but repeated sampling of highly similar items should decrease 
measurement error for the individual differences of interest. Statistical approaches to 
addressing measurement error could also be quite beneficial in these cases. Error-in 
variable methods, and in particular, structural equation modeling, are exceptionally 
useful for separating the reliable latent-variable “signals” from the error-variance 
“noise” (Anderson, Stone-Romero, & Tisak, 1996; Bollen, 1998). Although there are some 
examples of brain imaging data extracted from limited brain areas being incorporated 
into a structural equation model (Koechlin et al., 2003a; Lahey et al., 2012; McIntosh & B, 
2012), methods for using these techniques to refine individual difference covariates have 
not been integrated into major neuroimaging analysis packages. While sample sizes may 
still represent a limiting factor, experimental and statistical approaches to minimizing 
measurement error in individual difference have potential for helping to address these 
challenges.  
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6.3.3 Opportunities for a convergent approach to individual 
differences 
Finally, given these constraints, it is important to teach and maintain realistic 
expectations regarding what can be expected from neuroimaging approaches to 
individual differences. By and large, these findings should be explicitly reported as 
exploratory, thereby clearly acknowledging the influence of sampling variance in the 
estimated relationship. Given small sample sizes, unreliable trait measures, and a large 
number of tests, the potential for identifying spurious relationships between brain 
regions and individual difference measures is very high. Unless a study is strictly 
confirmatory and makes publicly accountable predictions ahead of time (Wagenmakers, 
Wetzels, Borsboom, van der Maas, & Kievit, 2012), individual difference results in 
neuroimaging should be interpreted as preliminary and hypothesis-generating, and not 
as predictive statements about the known state of relationships in the natural world 
(Cumming, 2014; Gelman, 2004).  
These limits to the neuroimaging approach to individual differences create 
opportunities for convergent cognitive neuroscience techniques less limited by 
participant-level sample sizes. Electroencephalography (EEG) has traditional been seen 
as a natural complement of neuroimaging, as it provides better temporal but poorer 
spatial information on cognitive processing. EEG has a substantially lower cost of 
acquisition per subject, and EEG waveforms have been shown to reflect individual 
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differences in cognitive processing and personality traits (Gale, 1973; Riding, Glass, 
Butler, & Pleydell-Pearce, 1997; San Martín, 2012).  
An altogether different set of techniques with great promise, however, are the 
neurostimulation procedures TMS and transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS). 
The evidence furnished by TMS and tDCS provides an ideal complement to exploratory 
evidence derived from neuroimaging studies. rTMS, and especially tDCS, are safe, non-
invasive, relatively easy to apply, and about as expensive as behavioral or EEG studies, 
once the (comparably small) investment in equipment has been made. This allows for 
the collection of large participant-level sample sizes, especially with tDCS, where it is 
quite feasible to collect data from multiple participants simultaneously (Fehr, 2009; 
Knoch et al., 2008). Experiments employing these techniques, which subtly manipulate 
brain activity and then observe the consequences on behavior, are capable of providing 
causal evidence regarding the involvement of particular brain regions in cognition. This 
form of evidence is inaccessible to neuroimaging, in which behavioral states are 
manipulated and changes in brain activation are observed. Neuroimaging and 
neurostimulation are thus ideally suited for an exploratory-confirmatory approach to 
cognitive neuroscience, and to the study of individual differences in the brain and 
cognition in particular. 
 144 
 6.4 Summary 
The research studies presented by this dissertation constitute a methodologically 
diverse and conceptually integrative approach to understanding impulsiveness in the 
context of cognitive control and decision making. Broadly, these findings address the 
validity of current conceptions of trait impulsiveness, relationships between those traits 
and brain or laboratory measures of cognitive control, and links between impulsive 
traits and economic decisions under conditions of delay or uncertainty. The findings 
presented in this thesis affirm the multidimensional nature of impulsiveness as a 
construct, and link individual differences in specific impulsive types to behavioral and 
neurobiological measures of control function. The nature of motor, attentional, and non-
planning impulsive types are contextualized by reference to evidence supporting a 
broad theory of behavioral control based on hierarchical organization of action, ranging 
from concrete acts to abstract plans and strategies. We provide evidence linking concrete 
forms of urgent/motor impulsiveness to behavior and brain activation during response-
related control, and more abstract and future-oriented premeditative/non-planning 
impulsiveness to decision control signals in more rostral PFC. Finally, these findings are 
complemented by causal evidence from a neurostimulation study linking a contextual 
control network to optimal behavior during risky decision making. Taken together, the 
results of these studies suggest that impulse control, cognitive control, and decision 
making may share a common organization from concrete to abstract. Our use of diverse 
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research techniques and confirmatory replication adds methodological rigor and 
provides convergent evidence linking impulsiveness to behavioral and decision control. 
This approach reinforces the advantages of an integrative approach across the domains 
of personality psychology, cognitive control, and decision making for understanding the 
flexible decision making and behavior. 
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Appendix A: ABIS (ABbreviated Impulsiveness Scale) 
Administration and Scoring 
The Abbreviated Impulsiveness Scale (ABIS) provides an efficient, 
reliable, valid, and generalizable measure of attentional, motor, and non-
planning impulsiveness. The ABIS can be used as a brief alternative to the BIS-11 
or as a model for reanalyzing previously collected BIS-11 questionnaire 
responses. 
 
DIRECTIONS: People differ in the ways they act and think in different 
situations. This is a test to measure some of the ways in which you act and 
think. Read each statement and put an X on the appropriate circle to the right. 
Do not spend too much time on any statement. Answer quickly and honestly. 
 
          О   
         Rarely/Never          Occasionally     Often        Almost Always/Always 
12  I am a careful thinker. (Reverse Scored)  
7    I plan trips well ahead of time. (Reverse Scored)  
2    I do things without thinking.  
9    I concentrate easily. (Reverse Scored)  
13  I plan for job security. (Reverse Scored)  
17  I act “on impulse.”  
8    I am self controlled. (Reverse Scored)  
14  I say things without thinking.  
5    I don’t “pay attention.”  
19  I act on the spur of the moment.  
1    I plan tasks carefully. (Reverse Scored)  
20  I am a steady thinker. (Reverse Scored)  
30  I am future oriented. (Reverse Scored)  
 
ABIS item order (using BIS-11 item numbering): 12, 7, 2, 9, 13, 17, 8, 14, 5, 19, 1, 
20, 30 
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ABIS Scales: 
Attention (5 items): 12, 9, 8, 5, 20 
Motor (4 items): 2, 17, 14, 19 
Non-planning (4 items): 7, 13, 1, 30 
 
Reverse-scored items (4, 3, 2, 1):  12, 7, 9, 13, 8, 1, 20, 30 
Standard-scored items (1, 2, 3, 4): 2, 17, 14, 5, 19 
 
To score each scale, take the average of the scores for each item on that 
scale (after reverse-scoring the specified items). Do not average across separate 
scales to produce combined scores. 
 
The BIS-11 items used as the basis for the ABIS can be found at: 
http://www.impulsivity.org/ 
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